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Cyberstalking, a New Crime:  Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and 
Federal Laws
Naomi Harlin Goodnoa
Introduction
The Internet is a powerful and wonderful tool that has brought on a new 
information age.  If it is purposely misused, however, it can be terrifying, and even 
deadly.  Imagine a distressed woman discovering the following messages on the Internet 
that was falsely attributed to her: 
“Female International Author, no limits to imagination and 
fantasies, prefers group macho/sadistic interaction . . . stop by my 
house at [current address] . . . .  Will take calls day or night at 
[current telephone number] . . . I promise you everything you ever 
dreamt about.  Serious responses only.”1
Or, imagine the fear generated by the following e-mail messages sent over and over again 
from someone who remained anonymous, but seemed to have specific knowledge of the 
recipient’s personal life:  
 “I’m just your worst nightmare.  Your troubles are just beginning.”2
Or, imagine the terror experienced by a woman who discovers a Website with the 
following message and realizes that she is the “her”:  
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1 J.A. HITCHCOCK, NET CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: OUTMANEUVERING THE SPAMMERS, SWINDLERS,
AND STALKERS WHO ARE TARGETING YOU ONLINE 11 (2002).   
2 HITCHCOCK, supra note 1, at 23. 
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“Oh great, now I’m really depressed, hmmm . . . looks like it’s 
suicide for me.  Car accident?  Wrists?  A few days later I think, 
‘hey,’ why don’t I kill her, too? =)”3
All of these messages are examples of cyberstalking.  Generally defined, stalking 
involves repeated harassing or threatening behavior.4 Today, advances in technology 
have created a new crime — cyberstalking.5 While there is not a universally accepted 
definition, cyberstalking involves the use of the Internet, e-mail, or other means of 
electronic communication to stalk (or harass) another individual. 6 The use of electronic 
technology has broadened the ways stalkers can harass their victims.   
This is a real problem.  A 1999 Report from the Department of Justice suggests 
there might be tens of thousands of cyberstalking incidents each year.7 For example, the 
Department of Justice reported in Los Angeles twenty percent of the 600 stalking cases 
were classified as cyberstalking; while in New York over forty percent of the stalking 
cases were classified as cyberstalking.8 “There link between cyberstalking and the sexual 
abuse of children is also recognized by the U.S. government.”9
3 HITCHCOCK, supra note 1, at 112.   
4 U.S. Department of Justice, Stalking and Domestic Violence: Report to Congress, 1 (May 2001), 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/ojp/186157.pdf [hereinafter Report to Congress].  Stalking behavior 
includes, but is not limited to following a person, appearing at a person’s home or business, harassing 
communications and/or messages (e.g., phone calls, letters), or vandalizing property. 
5 Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First 
Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2003). 
6 Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Stalking in America: Findings From the National Violence Against 
Women Survey, 1 (National Institute of Justice & Center for Disease Control and Prevention) (1998).  
(“Stalking generally refers to harassing or threatening behavior that an individual engages in repeatedly, 
such as following a person, appearing at a person’s home or place of business, making harassing phone 
calls, leaving written messages or objects, or vandalizing a person’s property.  These actions may or may 
not be accompanied by a credible threat of serious harm, and they may or may not be precursors to an 
assault or murder. . . . With cyber-harassment, the purpose remains the same: to cause distress to the 
targeted individual and to derive power from that distress.”). 
7 Report to Congress, supra note 4, at 6.   
8 Report to Congress, supra note 4, at 6.   
9 PAUL BOCIJ, CYBERSTALKING: HARASSMENT IN THE INTERNET AGE AND HOW TO PROTECT YOUR FAMILY 
11 (2004). 
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This article explores why the nature of cyberstalking represents a form of 
behavior that is distinct from “offline stalking”10 such that the interpretation of many of 
the statutes dealing with offline stalking may be inadequate to address the problem.11 
The first part of this article explores the differences between offline stalking and 
cyberstalking.  The second part examines what the criminal elements of cyberstalking 
should be in light of these differences.  The third part considers how these differences 
create gaps in both state and federal stalking statutes so that it may be difficult to 
adequately prosecute all aspects of cyberstalking.  This section also suggests ways to 
close these gaps and deal with potential   The fourth part deals with potential issues in 
criminalizing cyberstalking and how these issues might be resolved.  Finally, the 
Appendix to the article sets forth all state and federal stalking laws and how they might 
currently deal with cyberstalking, if at all.   
This article is limited to exploring cyberstalking in the criminal context.  There is 
a host of other legal issues, particularly in the civil realm, which is beyond the scope of 
this article.12 
I. Cyberstalking vs. Offline Stalking
a. Brief Review of Offline Stalking 
While cyberstalking is as recent a phenomena as the Internet itself, even offline 
 
10 For purposes of this article, “offline stalking” refers to stalking that occurs without communication via 
the computer.  “Cyberstalking” or “online stalking” refers to stalking that occurs via the computer with the 
use of the Internet and e-mail. 
11 “Law enforcement has often not caught up with the times, and officials are in many cases simply telling 
the victims to avoid the websites where they are being harassed or having their privacy violated. Some 
assistance can be found by contacting the Web host companies (if the material is on a website) or the ISP of 
the abuser. Many victims note that persistence is key. At times the seriousness of the impact of this type of 
violation is not comprehended and the third party facilitators of cyberstalkers tell the victim to work it out 
with their harasser.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberstalking. 
12 See, e.g., Joanna Lee Mishler, Cyberstalking: Can Communication via the Internet Constitute a Credible 
Threat, and Should an Internet Service Provider Be Liable if It Does?, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 115 (2000) (addressing the issue of vicarious liability for Internet Service Providers in 
cyberstalking cases).  In a later article, I intend to explore potential civil remedies for cyberstalking. 
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stalking is a relatively new crime.  Generally, the goal of a stalker is to exert “control” 
over the victim by instilling fear in her; and often such conduct leads to physical action.13 
California enacted the first stalking statute (targeted at offline stalking) in 1990 in 
response to the murder of Rebecca Schaeffer, star of the television series My Sister Sam.
Schaeffer was helpless in stopping an obsessed fan who had stalked her for over two 
years.  The stalking escalated and the fan eventually attacked and murdered her.14 
Other states, and soon the federal government, followed California’s lead and 
enacted stalking statutes to “fill gaps in the law.”15 Legislatures importantly recognized 
the need to stop stalkers before the stalking developed “into a more serious threat to a 
victim’s personal safety.”16 Additionally, stalking laws were enacted “to eliminate 
behaviors which disrupt normal life for the victim, and to prevent such behaviors from 
escalating into violence.”17 Statutes dealing with offline stalking were both preventative 
and proactive because they were intended to “criminalize certain acts of harassment in 
order to prevent more serious violent conduct by the stalker.”18 
Despite the enactment of these laws, offline stalking is still a major problem.  In 
this country alone, almost half a million victims are stalked each year, and approximately 
eighty-five percent are ordinary people without any celebrity or public status. 19 Offline 
stalking has “a profound effect upon the victim” by causing post-traumatic stress 
 
13 See id. at 120-25. 
14 Wayne R. LaFave, Physical Harm and Apprehension Thereof, in SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW CURRENT 
THROUGH THE 2006 UPDATE, PART THREE — OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON, 2 Subst. Crim. L. § 16.4(b) 
Stalking (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter Physical Harm and Apprehension Thereof]. 
15 Curry v. State, 811 So. 2d 736, 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).  
16 Id. at 743.  
17 James Thomas Tucker, Stalking the Problems With Stalking Laws: The Effectiveness of Florida Statutes 
Section 784.048, 45 FLA. L. REV. 609, 617 (1993).   
18 Id. Cyberstalking statutes should reflect the same goals of being proactive and preventative. 
19 Physical Harm and Apprehension Thereof, supra note ____. 
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disorder, depression20 and serious emotional distress, and also by escalating to physical 
attacks.  While the goal — to control and intimidate — is similar in both offline stalking 
and cyberstalking cases, there are differences in how the cyberstalker achieves this goal.  
These differences create legal problems for victims of cyberstalking.  
b. Differences Between Cyberstalking and Offline Stalking  
Some experts believe that cyberstalking is synonymous with traditional offline 
stalking because of the similarities in content and intent. 21 Similarities that are pointed to 
include: a desire to exert control over the victim;22 and, much like offline stalking, 
cyberstalking involves repeated harassing or threatening behavior, which is often a 
prelude to more serious behavior.23 While these similarities do exist, cyberstalking 
differs from offline stalking in four important ways.  These differences are crucial 
because they are the reasons why offline stalking statutes may fall short of addressing 
cyberstalking. 
1. Cyberstalkers can use the Internet to instantly harass their victims with 
wide dissemination. Cyberstalking takes place over the Internet.  While obvious, this 
distinction is extremely important because the Internet is a borderless medium that allows 
instantaneous and anonymous distribution of one’s message.  In this cyber-age, Internet 
Websites, e-mail, chat rooms, anonymous electronic bulletin boards, instant messaging, 
and other Web communication devices allow cyberstalkers to quickly disseminate 
intimidating and threatening messages.  Moreover, Internet content can be widely 
 
20 Physical Harm and Apprehension Thereof, supra note ____. 
21 Servance, supra note ____, at 1219. 
22 Report to Congress, supra note ____, at 1. 
23 Report to Congress, supra note ____, at 1; Harry Valetk, Mastering the Dark Arts of Cyberspace: A 
Quest for Sound Internet Safety Policies, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 54 (2004). 
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distributed to a larger, more public forum than any conventional form of offline stalking 
and it can be done so inexpensively and efficiently.     
For example, an offline stalker may harass the victim by repeatedly telephoning 
the victim.  However, every telephone call is a single event that requires the stalker’s 
action and time.  This behavior can easily snowball online because, with only one action, 
the stalker can create a harassing e-mail message that the computer systematically and 
repeatedly sends to the victim thousands upon thousands of times (e.g., an “e-mail 
bomb”).24 
Moreover, cyberstalkers can create a Website where they post harassing and 
threatening statements.  Thus, instead of sending harassing letters, the cyberstalker has 
the ability to post threatening comments for the whole world to view.  Such Websites 
allow for constant harassment, which compounds the invasion of privacy and ultimately 
the impact of cyberstalking.25 
2. Cyberstalkers can be physically far removed from their victim. Offline 
stalking often entails situations where the stalker is physically near the victim (i.e., in the 
same geographical area). 26 Cyberstalkers, however, can use the Internet to terrify their 
victim no matter where in the world she is; thus, she simply cannot escape.  The 
seemingly unlimited reach of the Internet makes cyberstalking distinct from offline 
stalking in three ways.   
First, it provides cyberstalkers a cheap and easy way to continue to contact their 
victim from anywhere in the world.  Cyberstalkers can stalk their victims from a different 
city, state, or even country, so long as there is access to the Internet, a medium which is 
 
24 BOCIJ, supra note ___ at 2. 
25 HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 100-116.    
26 Report to Congress, supra note ____, at 3; Valetk, supra note ____, at 54. 
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likely cheaper to use than a telephone and faster than mail.  Second, there is a sinister 
element to the secrecy of the cyberstalker’s location.  The uncertainty of the 
cyberstalker’s location can leave the victim in a state of constant panic as she is left 
wondering whether her stalker is in a neighboring house or a neighboring state.27 Finally, 
the physical location of the cyberstalker can create several jurisdictional problems.  
Because cyberstalking can easily take place across state lines, state prosecutors may 
confront jurisdictional problems in enforcing any state laws. 
3. Cyberstalkers can remain nearly anonymous.28 There is a common 
misperception that cyberstalking is less dangerous than offline stalking because it does 
not involve physical contact.29 The opposite, however, is true.  While a potential stalker 
may be unwilling to personally confront the victim, the anonymity of the Internet allows 
individuals, who may not otherwise engage in offline stalking, to send a harassing or 
threatening electronic communication.30 
The environment of cyberspace is designed to allow individuals to overcome 
personal inhibitions.  The ability to send anonymous harassing or threatening 
communications allows a perpetrator to overcome any hesitation, unwillingness, or 
inabilities he may encounter when confronting a victim in person.  Perpetrators may even 
 
27 See, e.g., Louse Ellison, Cyberstalking:  Tackling Harassment on the Internet, in CRIME AND THE 
INTERNET (David S. Wall ed., 2001). 
28 The issue of whether anonymity should be regulated on the Internet is a current debate.  See, e.g., George 
F. du Pont, The Criminalization of True Anonymity in Cyberspace, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
191, 196-216 (2000-2001).  Du Pont’s analysis distinguishes between “true anonymity,” which is 
untraceable, and “pseudo-anonymity,” which, although indirectly, is inherently traceable.  He cites a 
historical precedent for pseudo-anonymity, and realizes its social good for anonymous public debate (i.e., 
the American Revolutionary period, The Federalist Papers, modern political campaigns, etc.).  Where the 
courts and history have recognized a free speech value to anonymity, it has almost always meant pseudo-
anonymity.  But true anonymity is prone to abuse and danger.  Cyberspace has greatly increased the ease 
with which true anonymity can be attained.  Du Pont’s proposal is to criminalize all non-privileged, truly 
anonymous communication in cyberspace, and mandate that all anonymous communication in cyberspace 
be merely pseudo-anonymous.  See id. at 196-216. 
29 Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2001). 
30 See BOCIJ, supra note ____, at 90-106.  
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be encouraged to continue these acts.31 Additionally, the anonymity of the Internet 
allows cyberstalkers to follow and spy on their victims in cyberspace for extended 
periods of time without the victim’s knowledge.32 
As one scholar has explained, there is a “veil of anonymity” on the Internet that 
puts cyberstalkers “at an advantage.”33 Anonymity makes it difficult to identify, locate, 
and arrest stalkers.  In fact, cyberstalkers can use technologies to strip away many 
identifying markers from their communications. 34 
4. Cyberstalkers can easily impersonate the victim.  Unlike offline stalking, the 
cyberstalker can easily take on the identity of the victim and create havoc on-line.  The 
cyberstalker, pretending to be the victim, can send lewd e-mails, post inflammatory 
messages on multiple bulletin boards, and offend hundreds of chat room participants.  
The victim is then banned from bulletin boards, accused of improper conduct, and 
flooded with threatening messages from those the stalker offended in the victim’s name. 
This is exactly what happened to Jane Hitchcock who was cyberstalked by the 
owner of a company after she complained about the company’s services.  Intending to 
provoke others, the cyberstalker impersonated Hitchcock and posted inflammatory 
comments on Web pages and sent e-mails in her name aimed at provoking others to 
“flame” her. 35 Moreover, for over a year, the cyberstalker “e-mail bomb[ed]” her by 
 
31 Report to Congress, supra note ____, at 2. 
32 Such conduct would still be considered harassment if the cyberstalker has the intent to harass the victim.  
See U.S. Department of Justice, 1999 Report on Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement and 
Industry — A Report From the Attorney General to the Vice President, 12 (Aug. 1999), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm (last visited Aug. 2005)[hereinafter 1999 
Report on Cyberstalking].     
33 Amy C. Radosevich, Note, Thwarting the Stalker: Are Anti-Stalking Measures Keeping Pace with 
Today’s Stalkers?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1371, 1387 (2000).  
34 Radosevich, supra note ____, at 1388. 
35 For example, impersonating Hitchcock, the cyberstalker sent the following e-mail to her employer: “I’m 
an assistant teacher at UMUC and I think you and the whole of UMUC are a bunch of morons insidiously 
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sending thousands of harassing messages to her e-mail account.  He would also send 
thousands of harassing messages to her husband’s and her employer’s e-mail accounts, 
sometime impersonating Hitchcock, which eventually flooded the accounts rendering 
them “useless.”36 The cyberstalker’s actions became so unbearable that Hitchcock was 
forced to physically move, but that did not stop him.  He eventually found her on-line and 
would begin to harass her again.  Hitchcock sued him,37 but the cyberstalker was never 
held criminally liable.38 
5. Cyberstalkers can encourage “innocent” third-party harassment.39 
Perhaps most frightening, and unique to cyberstalking, is that cyberstalkers can incite 
other “innocent” third parties to do their stalking for them.  For example, in California, a 
fifty-year-old defendant used the Internet to solicit the rape of a twenty-eight-year-old 
woman who had rejected the defendant’s romantic advances. 40 The defendant then 
terrorized her by impersonating her in various Internet chat rooms and posting her 
telephone number, address, and messages that she fantasized of being raped.  Because of 
these messages, on separate occasions, at least six men knocked on the woman’s door 
saying that they wanted to rape her.41 Hitchcock experienced a similar form of 
 
festering away your small brains.  I may or may not resign.  I may stay to awaken you idiots . . . .”  
HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 8.    
36 HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 5-14.   
37 Id. See also BOCIJ, supra note ____, at 1-3. 
38 Hitchcock sued her cyberstalker who eventually settled.  The cyberstalker also pled guilty to conspiracy 
to commit mail fraud and perjury for the conduct related to Hitchcock’s original complaints.  However, he 
was never prosecuted for any crime related to stalking or harassment. BOCIJ, supra note ____, at 2.  
39 Other scholars have referred to this as “stalking by-proxy.”  See BOCIJ, supra note ____, at 25-26. 
40 See Bill Wallace, Stalkers Find a New Tool -- The Internet  
E-mail Is Increasingly Used to Threaten and Harass, Authorities Say, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jul. 10, 2000, 
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/07/10/MN39633.DTL. 
41 See id. 
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cyberstalking when her cyberstalker advertised her telephone and address on an alt-sex 
site advertising for “sadistic interaction.”42 
Another example of duping “innocent” third parties to do the harassing involves a 
cyberstalker that sent hate e-mail in his victim’s name, often times with her telephone 
number and address, “to groups of Satanist, drug users and pornographers.”43 She only 
discovered this when the cyberstalker’s actions prompted a threatening and terrifying 
telephone call from a man who lived twenty minutes from her:  “’You’d better get a gun 
because the next time we read about you it will be in a police report.’”44 It was later 
discovered that the cyberstalker was the victim’s disgruntled business acquaintance, but 
the victim had no criminal recourse.45 
In the end, the Internet makes many of the frightening characteristics of offline 
stalking even more intense.  It provides cyberstalkers with twenty-four-hour access, 
instantaneous connection, efficient and repetitious action, and anonymity.  On top of all 
that, cyberstalkers can easily pretend that they are different people.  The possibilities 
open to cyberstalkers are as endless as the borders of the ubiquitous Internet.  It is for 
these reasons that the laws should be updated to deal with this new crime.46 
42 HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 11. 
43 N.Y.  State Assemb. A05376 (N.Y. 2006), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A05376. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See, e.g., Radosevich, supra note ____, at 1389.  (“Until broader language is implemented to cover the 
use of new information technologies and methodologies in [cyber]stalking cases, victims may have to 
search for alternative solutions”).  Some of those solutions include: utilizing more computer specialists on 
law enforcement task forces; combating technology with technology by providing computerized response 
systems for victims; launching public awareness campaigns and educational Websites so that victims are 
informed of their options and rights; and getting Internet Service Providers involved in the regulation 
process. Id. at 1391-95. 
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II. Examining the Criminal Elements of Cyberstalking
Since there are differences between cyberstalking and offline stalking, the 
question arises whether the current stalking laws, which were drafted to criminalize 
offline stalking, are adequate to deal with all aspects of cyberstalking.  The answer – not 
fully.  Therefore, the remainder of this article sets forth what the elements of 
cyberstalking should be in order to adequately deal with the crime.  
The Appendix to this article summarizes the current stalking laws in all fifty 
states and the federal equivalents.  The Appendix sets forth whether the statute 
specifically addresses cyberstalking and, if not, how the existing stalking statute might be 
used to prosecute cyberstalking crimes.  Those statutes that have attempted to incorporate 
cyberstalking into their offline stalking statutes are often inadequate because of the 
differences between cyberstalking and offline stalking.  Indeed, even some of the statutes 
that were enacted to target cyberstalking still fail to address all of its vices.47 To 
understand these inadequacies, the general elements of offline stalking need to be 
considered in comparison to what the elements should be for this new crime of 
cyberstalking.48 
As set forth in this next section, cyberstalking and offline stalking should share 
the same intentional mental state requirement; but, to be effective, cyberstalking statutes 
should criminalize conduct that either puts a “reasonable person” in fear of bodily harm 
or causes severe emotional distress.  Furthermore, the cyberstalking statute should 
 
47 See infra Appendix to this article. 
48 Because stalking statutes are all over the board, this next section is not intended to summarize all 
harassment laws.  However, it does attempt to generally categorize the statutes to determine what 
requirements are most adequate to combat cyberstalking. 
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specifically address situations where the cyberstalker entices third parties to harass for 
them. 
a.  The “intentional” mens rea requirement. As with most crimes, offline 
stalking has both mens rea and actus reus requirements.49 Generally, a stalker must 
“willfully or intentionally” (mental state) engage in “repetitive conduct” or a “course of 
conduct” (actus reus) that causes the victim to fear, or that the stalker should have known 
would cause the victim to fear for her safety.50 Although there are many differences in 
offline stalking statutes, the majority of them have a similar intentional mental state 
requirement.51 
As far as cyberstalking is concerned, this “intentional” mental state requirement is 
appropriate.  The point of cyberstalking laws, much like offline stalking statutes, should 
be to stop individuals from purposefully causing another to fear.52 Like an offline stalker, 
a cyberstalker should have to “intentionally” engage in conduct that causes his target to 
fear for her safety (or should have known would cause fear for her safety).   
b.  The need to criminalize a “course of conduct” that would cause a 
“reasonable person” to fear for her safety.  A more difficult analysis arises concerning 
the actus reus requirement.  What “conduct” should be criminal?  There are two 
 
49 See, e.g., United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 121 (3d ed. 2003) (specifying that crimes conventionally have both 
elements).  
50 See infra Appendix to this article.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90 (2005) (“Stalking” requires that a 
person intentionally follow or harass another person, and intend to place this other person in reasonable fear 
of death or serious bodily harm.).  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2923 (2005) (“A person commits stalking if 
the person intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct that is directed toward another person, 
and if that conduct” would cause a reasonable person fear.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (2005) 
(“Stalking is the intentional and repeated following or harassing of another person that would cause a 
reasonable person to feel fear….”).  But see ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.260- 41.270 (2004) (requiring only 
that the perpetrator “knowingly” engage in a course of conduct that recklessly places another person in fear 
of death or physical injury). 
51 See infra Appendix to this article.  
52 See id. 
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considerations here.  First, most offline stalking statutes require the conduct be 
“repetitive.”  In other words, to be in violation of the law, the stalker has to engage in 
conduct at least more than once in such a way that causes the victim to fear. 53 This 
requirement is suitably applicable to cyberstalking.  It is appropriate to require that the 
cyberstalker engage in “repeated” conduct—e.g., e-mailing a harassing message more 
than once; or posting a message on a website that causes others to harass the victim more 
than once. 
The second consideration, however, is where the real issue arises when offline 
stalking laws are applied to cyberstalking.  This second matter concerns the type of
conduct that is criminal.  Generally,54 there are three different types of conduct that 
offline stalking statutes criminalize:  (1) conduct requiring an element of physical or 
visible proximity to the victim; 55 (2) conduct conveying verbal or written threats or 
threats implied by conduct, i.e., a “credible threat”;56 and (3) conduct that would cause a 
“reasonable person” to fear physical harm or to suffer severe emotional distress 
(hereinafter the “reasonable person standard”).57 As set forth below, statutes in 
categories one or two fall far short in combating cyberstalking because such statutes 
focus solely on the perpetrator’s conduct.  On the other hand, laws with a “reasonable 
 
53 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229 (West 2005) (defining course of conduct as conduct composed of 
two or more acts separated by at least thirty-six hours, but occurring within one year); see also infra 
Appendix to this article.   
54 It is difficult to attempt to categorize all stalking statutes because there is a huge variety in defining what 
conduct constitutes “stalking.”  See, e.g., Keirsten L. Walsh, Comment, Safe and Sound at Last?  
Federalized Anti-Stalking Legislation in the United States and Canada, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 373 (1996).  
For purposes of this article, the laws have been generally divided into three categories to illustrate what 
elements best define cyberstalking; however, not all stalking laws necessarily distinctly fit into one of the 
three categories. 
55 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2923 (2005).  
56 See, e.g,, ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120(a)(4) (2004); see also infra Appendix to this article.   
57 See, e.g, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2005); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-181e (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-7905 to -7906 (2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.749 (West 2005); see also infra Appendix to this article.   
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person” standard can fully address cyberstalking because such laws correctly focus on the 
effect of the perpetrator’s conduct on the victim (e.g., the fear felt by the victim).58 
(i) Problems with physical proximity requirement. Currently, there are only a 
few offline stalking statutes that require that the defendant engage in conduct that has 
some requirement of actual physical pursuit.59 Since the very nature of cyberstalking 
allows the cyberstalker to be in an entirely different physical location than his victim, 
statutes that require an element of physical or visual proximity cannot address the crime. 
For example, in one 1996 cyberstalking case in Georgia, a cyberstalker posted a 
crude message on a website that gave his victim’s telephone number and home address 
and advertised that she was a prostitute.  Many responded to the message by calling and 
showing up at her front door and “innocently” harassed the victim.60 Under Georgia’s 
stalking statute at that time (the statute has since been amended), 61 the cyberstalker was 
found innocent of stalking because his conduct did not include the physical pursuit of the 
victim.62 
(ii) Problems with credible threat requirement. Many current stalking statutes 
require the perpetrator to make a “credible threat” of violence against the victim.63 
Generally, a credible threat is “a verbal or written threat” coupled “with the apparent 
 
58 Joseph C. Merschman, The Dark Side of the Web: Cyberstalking and the Need for Contemporary 
Legislation, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 255, 260 (2001).   
59 See, e.g, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181c (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West 2005); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-802 (West 2005) (formerly MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 124);  N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:12-10 (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-277.3 (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 
(West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (2005); see also infra Appendix to this article.   
60 See Working to Stop Online Abuse, http://www.cyberstalked.org/ourstory. 
61 GA CODE ANN. § 46-5-21 (West 2006). 
62 See Working to Stop Online Abuse, http://www.cyberstalked.org/ourstory. 
63 Over one-third of state stalking statutes have a credible threat requirement.  See infra Appendix to this 
article; see also Report to Congress, supra note ____, at 1. 
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ability to carry out the threat” so as to cause the victim fear.64 It is the requirement of the 
“threat” and the “apparent ability” to carry it out that makes this standard inadequate to 
deal with cyberstalking in at least four ways.   
First, the requirement that there be an overt “threat” is problematic.  Such a 
requirement leaves a gap for punishment of conduct that does not specifically threaten, 
but would still cause a reasonable person to fear for her safety.  Stalkers typically do not 
explicitly threaten their victims, but instead “pursue a course of conduct that, when taken 
in the aggregate, would cause fear in a reasonable person but stops short of a [] threat.”65 
For example, an offline stalker may lurk behind bushes to watch the victim, 
follow her, continuously call her and hang-up, and send black roses to her.  Since none of 
these actions include an overt threat, such punishment would likely not establish the 
credible threat requirement.  In cyberstalking cases, a statute with a credible threat 
requirement does not protect against electronic communications (such as thousands of e-
mail messages) that are harassing, but do not include an actual threat.66 
These issues associated with a credible threat standard are being litigated in 
offline stalking cases.  One state replaced the credible threat requirement in its stalking 
statute with a reasonable person standard because of these issues-issues which become 
even more acute in cyberstalking cases.67 In Iowa  v. Limbrecht,68 the court recognized 
the change in the statute and explained that whether a stalking conviction would be 
reversed depended on which standard applied.  The Limbrecht defendant, a prison inmate 
 
64 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
65 Merschman, supra note ___ at 260. 
66 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2005) (harassing electronic communications do not constitute 
cyberstalking unless there is a credible threat).  See Iowa v. Limbrecht, 600 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1999); 
United States v. Alkabazah, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). 
67 Compare IOWA CODE § 780.11 (1993), with IOWA CODE § 780.11 (2006).   
68 Limbrecht, 600 N.W.2d at 316-17.   
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became obsessed with a young woman, Stacy Corey, who worked as an employee at the 
prison.  The defendant’s repetitive, intimidating stares and lies to other inmates about 
how he had sexual relations with her forced Corey to quit and move.69 However, the 
defendant’s obsession continued when he was released from prison.  He found Corey’s 
new address and sent vulgar, untrue letters to Corey’s husband about how Corey had 
sexual relations with many inmates when she worked at the prison.70 The defendant also 
drove by Corey’s house a number of times, which ultimately led to his arrest and stalking 
conviction.71 The defendant appealed his conviction arguing that he never explicitly 
threatened to hurt Corey.  The court acknowledged that the defendant never threatened 
Corey, but rejected his argument because it “harken[ed] back” to the former version of 
the stalking statute which required proof of a “credible threat” against another person.72 
Under the amended version of the statute which adopted the reasonable person standard, 
the court found that the defendant’s actions assumed frightening proportions and was no 
less threatening than an actual threat.73 
As exemplified by Limbrecht, the issue of whether a credible threat requirement is 
the appropriate standard is being debated in offline stalking cases. 74 This issue, however, 
 
69 Limbrecht, 600 N.W.2d at 317. 
70 Id. at 318-19. 
71 Id. at 319. 
72 Id. See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11(1)(a) (West 1993) (defining a “credible threat” as “a threat made 
with the intent to place a reasonable person in like circumstances in fear of death or bodily injury, coupled 
with the apparent ability to carry out the threat.”).   
73 Limbrecht, 600 N.W.2d at 319 (citing IOWA CODE § 708.11(1)(b) (1997)).  See also 1994 IOWA ACTS 
1093, § 4.   
74 When determining whether to adopt a credible threat requirement or reasonable person standard, the 
drafters of the federal model rule specifically choose to use the reasonable person standard instead of the 
credible threat requirement.  See Walsh, supra note ____, at 389 (“On the other hand, the model code did 
not use the language ‘credible threat’ when defining the behavior directed toward the victim.  In order to 
prohibit behavior in the form of threats implied by conduct, the model code purposely omitted this 
language for fear it would be construed as requiring an actual verbal or written threat.”). 
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is even more acute with cyberstalking.75 The Internet makes it easier for a cyberstalker to 
engage in a threatening course of conduct in a much shorter period of time than an offline 
stalker.  In Limbrecht, the stalker sent two letters over the course of one month.76 
Cyberstalkers, on the other hand, can easily use the Internet to send hundreds, even 
thousands, of frightening e-mail messages (similar the letters sent in Limbrecht) in a 
matter of one hour,77 which over days and weeks can create havoc on a victim.  If there is 
not one explicit threat in any of those thousands of e-mail messages, then the victim 
cannot establish the credible threat requirement. 78 
A second problem with a credible threat requirement in cyberstalking cases is an 
issue of receipt.  A “threat” suggests a communication directly from the stalker to the 
victim.  But a cyberstalker can easily post terrifying messages without ever being in 
direct contact with the victim or without the victim ever personally receiving the 
message.  A cyberstalker can broadcast harassing messages to the entire Internet world by 
posting them on Web pages and blogs.  In cyberstalking cases then, the stalker can 
quickly and effortlessly engage in terrifying conduct to harass the victim—conduct no 
less threatening than an actual threat—with world-wide dissemination.  
 
75 Report to Congress, supra note ____, at 45 n.3.  See also Federal Interstate Stalking Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
2261A (2006) (codifying a “reasonable fear” standard). 
76 Limbrecht, 600 N.W.2d at 317-18. 
77 For example, a cyberstalker can send “e-mail bombs”—meaning that the cyberstalker can generate one e-
mail message and use the computer to continuously send the same message over-and-over to the same 
recipient. 
78 The overt threat also usually has to be verbal or written, which may also raise issues in cyberstalking 
cases.  A “verbal” threat requires physical nearness to the victim, which, analogous to statutes that have a 
“physical proximity” requirement, unnecessarily carves out many cyberstalking cases since the stalking 
takes place virtually.  A “written” threat requirement seems more applicable to cyberstalking, but even that 
may be problematic.  If the statute has a written threat requirement, but does not make clear that “written” 
includes “electronic communication,” then some computer generated messages may not be included.  Many 
statutes do not cover the various types of electronic communications (e.g., e-mail, message boards, chat 
rooms, blogs, instant messenger, etc.).  See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.130-.150 (West 2005); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3A-3 to -3A-3.1 (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.60 (McKinney 2005). 
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For example, in one case, a cyberstalker created a webpage “dedicated” to his 
young victim, Amy Boyer.79 The cyberstalker was a fellow student who, unbeknownst to 
Boyer, wrote detailed fantasies about Boyer and messages about Boyer’s daily life (such 
as what she wore on any particular day, where she went, what she was doing) and posted 
them on the webpage.  These postings went on for about two years and tragically ended 
when the stalker murdered Boyer and committed suicide.80 Neither Boyer nor her family 
was aware of any of these messages on the website until after she was murdered.  
Although this case was never litigated, it might have been difficult for Boyer to establish 
that there was a credible threat.  A threat was never sent directly to her, so it would have 
been difficult to show that the cyberstalker actually threatened her.81 
A third problem that the credible threat requirement creates in cyberstalking cases 
is that it requires the victim to prove that the cyberstalker had the “apparent ability” to 
carry out whatever he threatens.  What if the cyberstalker sends a threatening e-mail to 
the victim from across the country?  It would seem that the victim might then have the 
burden to prove that the cyberstalker had the financial ability to buy a plane ticket to 
travel across the country to carry-out that threat.  Such a requirement is onerous and 
unnecessary.   
In fact, the victim may not even know where an anonymous cyberstalker is 
physically located.  For all she knows the cyberstalker might be next door, at her 
workplace or across the country, making it even more difficult to establish that a threat 
could be carried out.  The Internet allows for anonymity when sending any type of 
 
79 HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 100-116.    
80 Id. 
81 See intra part III of this article (fully explaining United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 
1997)). 
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electronic communication.  Cyberstalkers covet anonymity because it allows them to hide 
from reality and from their victims.82 Victims who are stalked by unknown persons 
cannot know the perpetrator’s habits or intentions.83 Thus, as identities are concealed, so 
too are all the character traits of the perpetrators.  Where the identities and abilities of 
cyberstalkers are unknown to the victim, it is impossible for the victim to determine 
whether the perpetrator has the apparent ability to carry out the threat.  Thus, it will be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to show that an anonymous cyberstalker has the 
ability to carry out any threat.  
The fourth problem with the credible threat requirement in cyberstalking cases is 
that it completely fails to address cases where the cyberstalker incites “innocent” third 
parties to harass the victim. 84 In situations where, for example, the cyberstalkers take on 
the identity of the victim and post messages inviting gang rape, there is neither an overt 
threat, nor a threat sent from the cyberstalker directly to the victim. 
In short, statutes—either those that have attempted to incorporate cyberstalking in 
preexisting statutes or those that have been specifically targeted at cyberstalking—which 
have a credible threat requirement cannot fully address all aspects of cyberstalking.  This 
is because they focus on the cyberstalker’s conduct.  The reasonable person standard, 
however, is better in cyberstalking cases because it focuses on the fear that the 
cyberstalker intentionally meant to instill in his victim. 
 
82 Rebecca K. Lee, Romantic and Electronic Stalking in a College Context, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
373, 381-82 (1998).  Also, because the Internet is “essentially a ‘decontextualized’ medium…people can 
send messages without revealing their handwriting or other clues to their personality…. Cyberstalkers can 
easily disguise themselves by adopting several false names and forging e-mail messages.”  Id. at 409.  
Furthermore, a victim may be more hesitant to report a threat if their stalker is anonymous.  Id. at 382.   
83 Lee, supra note ___ at 382. 
84 Rose Hunter, Cyberstalking, (2001), http://gsulaw.gsu.edu/lawand/papers/fa01/hunter/.
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(iii) The reasonable person standard:  the appropriate standard. Those 
stalking statutes that have a reasonable person standard provide the most successful way 
to prosecute cyberstalking.85 Such standard has no physical proximity requirement.  
Furthermore, the standard addresses many of the problems created by statutes with a 
credible threat requirement.  The reasonable person standard does not require that the 
cyberstalker send an explicit threat to the victim, nor does it require that the victim prove 
the cyberstalker had the ability to carry it out.   Instead, the focus is on the victim and 
whether it is reasonable for her to fear for her safety because of the cyberstalker’s 
conduct.  
Distinguishing between statutes that require a credible threat from those that use 
the “reasonable person” standard requires careful reading of the entire statute.  The 
Delaware stalking statute, for example, makes it a crime for a person to intentionally 
engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable 
person fear.86 Facially, this statute does not appear to require a credible threat.  But, it is 
important to not immediately assume that this statute focuses only on the fear felt by the 
victim.  Further reading reveals that “course of conduct” includes either maintaining 
physical proximity to the victim, conveying a verbal or written threat, or a threat implied 
 
85 For purposes of this paper, the “reasonable person standard’ is similar to statutes that criminalizes 
repeated conduct that “harasses,” “annoys,” or “alarms” (hereinafter “harassment statutes”).  Some states 
have two statutes, one dealing with stalking and the other harassment.  Often, the harassment statutes adopt 
the broad “to harass” standard.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-182b (West 2005); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-17-07 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.230 (West 2005).  See also infra Appendix to 
this article.  The harassment standard may encompass many of the same cyberstalking situations that would 
be addressed by the reasonable person standard; however, as set forth in this section the best standard to 
apply to cyberstalking would be the reasonable standard.  Moreover, many of the harassment statutes are 
limited to misdemeanors.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108(a)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2005); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 653m (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 
1311-12 (2005); see also infra Appendix to this article.   
86 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (2005). 
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by conduct (a standard akin to a “credible threat”).87 Thus, even though the “reasonable 
person” language appears in the statute, a full reading of it shows that it might be 
equivalent to all other cyberstalking statutes requiring a credible threat.  
(iv) Criminalizing situations where the cyberstalkers entice “innocent” third-
parties to harass.   
One of the most apparent differences between cyberstalking and stalking is that 
cyberstalkers can entice third parties to do the work for them.88 Currently, only one state 
has taken the approach to specifically criminalize such behavior. 89 This is the best 
approach.  So that neither cyberstalkers nor victims are unclear that this conduct is 
criminal, statutes criminalizing cyberstalking should directly provide that no person 
should use the Internet to cause another to engage in conduct that would cause a 
reasonable person to fear for her safety.  
III. Current Laws Dealing with Cyberstalking
a.  Addressing the Gaps in State Laws 
As illustrated in the Appendix to this article, state statutes that might be used to 
prosecute cyberstalking do not have clear and equal standards.  Rather, they are all over 
the board.90 Statutes with a physical proximity or a credible threat requirement are 
impractical and ineffective in prosecuting cyberstalkers.  Statutes that are most useful and 
successful in prosecuting cyberstalkers and protecting victims are those which shift the 
focus from the perpetrator’s behavior to the effect on the victim.91 
87 Id.  See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West 2005) (“Course of conduct” requires either repeatedly 
maintaining a visual or physical proximity, or a threat).  
88 See supra part I of this article. 
89 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.21 (B) (West 2005). 
90 See infra Appendix to this article. 
91 Merschman, supra note ____, at 255-56.  
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Generally, there are three categories of state laws.92 The laws in each of these 
categories have gaps such that they may not fully be able to address all aspects of 
cyberstalking.  Each of these categories is taken in turn.   
1.  State statutes that do not address cyberstalking. 
First, there are some state laws that do not address cyberstalking at all.  Most 
obvious are those statutes that have physical pursuit requirements.93 There are other 
statutes that do not address cyberstalking because it is unclear if they cover any form of 
electronic communication.94 For example, some states have a telephone harassment 
statute, but the statute only covers telephone communications (not specifically electronic 
communications).95 Laws that require physical pursuit and laws that fail to include 
electronic communications cannot reach cyberstalking. 
2.  Gaps in state statutes that may address some aspects of cyberstalking. 
The second general category of state statutes encompasses the majority of the 
current state laws.  The laws in this category raise three issues.   
First, some states have attempted to amend existing offline stalking statutes to 
cover cyberstalking via “electronic communications.”96 The type of electronic 
communications covered by these statutes varies.  While some states simply inserted the 
 
92 As set forth in the Appendix to this article, the state stalking and harassment laws are literally all over the 
board.  This section attempts to generally categorize them to show why some of the laws do not work in 
cyberstalking cases, and why others may work in part.  The Appendix, however, provides a specific 
analysis for each state law.  See infra Appendix to this article. 
93 See, e.g, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181 (West 2005); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-802 (West 
2005) (formerly MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 124); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 120.55 (McKinney 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.60 (McKinney 2005); see also infra Appendix to this 
article. 
94 See, e.g, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181e (West 2005); 
D.C. CODE § 22-404 (2005); see also infra Appendix to this article. 
95 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4113 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-96 (West 2005). 
96 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90 (West 2005) ("contact" means “any communication including but 
not limited to communication by computer, computer network, or by any other electronic device.”); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 711-1106.4 to -1106.5 (LexisNexis 2005) (non-consensual contact includes contact via 
electronic mail transmission).  
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general phrase “electronic communications” into existing statutes, others identified 
specific types of communications (e.g., e-mails, computer communications, or 
communications on the network).97 Although it is promising that some states are 
beginning to take notice of cyberstalking crimes, the results thus far have been a wide 
variety of mostly inadequate statutes with a hodgepodge of definitions, requirements, 
protections, and penalties.     
Amending current stalking statutes to include electronic communications is a step 
in the right direction.  Unfortunately, this is not enough.  For example, New York’s anti-
stalking laws covers electronic communications,98 but state legislatures have introduced 
bills targeted specifically at cyberstalking and at making it a felony.99 This suggests that 
simply amending preexisting stalking statutes may be insufficient to combat 
cyberstalking. 
Moreover, while some statutes may cover electronic communications, the 
language of the statutes seems to suggest that it would only apply to messages sent 
directly to the victim (e.g., an e-mail sent directly from the cyberstalker to his victim), but 
not to other Internet postings.100 Such statutes may unnecessarily carve out those 
 
97 See, e.g., infra Appendix to this article; CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2005) (including a computer 
with in the meaning of an “electronic communication device,” and defining “electronic communications” 
according to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006)); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1106.4 to -1106.5 (LexisNexis 
2005) (“Non-consensual contact” includes contact via electronic mail transmission); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
5-90 (West 2005) (including, but not limiting communication to communication by computer, computer 
network, or by any other electronic device); see also, Shawn Hutton & Sandy Haantz, Cyberstalking,
(National White Collar Crime Center), www.nw3c.org.  The investigators and prosecutors of these units 
receive continual training in the fields of computer networks, surveillance, evidence gathering, as well as 
the proper resources to address these technical claims. 
98 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.45-50 (McKinney 2005). 
99 N.Y.  State Assemb. A05376 (N.Y. 2006), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A05376.  
100 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805(a) (West 2005); see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.260 to 
41.270 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-209(a)(1) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (2005); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108(a)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183 (West 2005); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-182b (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-7906(2)(a) (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-2(a)(4)(A)-(B) (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. §
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cyberstalking cases like the Boyer case where the stalker created an entire website 
dedicated to following her every move, but never sent an e-mail directly to her.101 It also 
carves out those cases where the cyberstalker encourages “innocent” third party 
harassment. 
This leads to the second issue.  There is also a group of offline stalking statutes 
that have a credible threat requirement or the equivalent.  There are many laws that 
require that the electronic communication between the cyberstalker and the victim 
include a specific threat, which is virtually the same as having a credible threat 
standard.102 Other statutes require that the communication contain a credible threat when 
the perpetrator is not physically pursuing the victim.103 And, there are even other 
statutes that, at first glance, seem to have a reasonable person standard, but upon close 
reading still require that a credible threat be made. 104 As set forth earlier in this article, a 
statute with a credible threat standard, even where electronic communications are 
included, cannot deal with all aspects of cyberstalking.   
The final issue is that none of the statutes in this second category explicitly 
address situations where the cyberstalker dupes “innocent” third parties to harass his 
victim.  For a few states, there may be a way to address this issue with the current laws, 
however, it has not yet been litigated.   Some states have two types of general statutes 
 
708.71(a)(1) (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 525.080 (West 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 
(West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-14a (LexisNexis 2005). 
101 HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 112.    
102 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 836.10 (West 2005). 
103 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2923 (2005) (requiring an actual threat when the perpetrator is 
not physically pursuing the victim); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229 (West 2005) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 1312A (2005) (same).  
104 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 1312A (2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-
A(2)(A) (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07 
(2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(a)(ii) (2005); see also 
infra Appendix to this article. 
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that might address cyberstalking – those directed at stalking and those directed at 
harassment.105 Generally, harassment statutes has a broader reach addressing those 
situations where the stalker engages in conduct with intent to “annoy,” “harass,” or 
“alarm” the victim.106 Such a standard is more akin to the reasonable person standard 
since it does not require a credible threat.  Arguably, when a stalker entices a third party 
to do the stalking, he has annoyed and harassed his victim.  However, even if this 
argument is successfully made--which is yet to be seen--most of the state statutes that 
have this broad harassment standard only establish misdemeanors, not felonies.107 
3.  Gaps in state statutes that are intended to address cyberstalking. 
The last category of state laws is comprised of a small group of statutes that 
specifically deal with cyberstalking.  As of August 2006, there are only six states 
(Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Washington) that 
enacted new “cyberstalking” statutes.108 Importantly, these states passed criminal laws 
specifically dealing with cyberstalking even though they already had offline stalking 
statutes with a “reasonable person standard” or a more general harassment standard.109 
105 See infra Appendix to this article. 
106 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1106 (LexisNexis 2005). IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-10-1, -
5(b)(1)(B) (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.7 (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-A 
(2005). 
107 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108(a)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (West 
2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1311-12 (2005); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.7 (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
525.080 (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411h (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 
(West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575 (West 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700 (2005). 
108 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.3 (2005); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 97-45-15 (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3 (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2 
(2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West 2005).   
109 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 135/1-2 (West 2005) (harassment); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 
(West 2005) (cyberstalking); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (2005) (stalking); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:40.3 (2005) (cyberstalking); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107 (West 2005) (stalking with reasonable person 
standard); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (West 2005) (cyberstalking); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-277.3 
(West 2005) (stalking with reasonable person standard); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3 (West 2005) 
(cyberstalking); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-59-1 and 2 (2004) (stalking with harassment standard); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (2004) (cyberstalking); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West 2005) (stalking 
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The enactment of these cyberstalking statutes illustrates an essential point; namely, these 
states recognized that offline stalking statutes, even if amended, are inadequate to deal 
with cyberstalking.   
For example, Washington’s offline stalking statute criminalizes conduct that the 
stalker “[k]nows or reasonably should know [would cause the person to be] afraid, 
intimidated, or harassed even if the stalker did not intend to place the person in fear or 
intimidate or harass the person.”110 This Washington statute also applies to electronic 
communications. 111 Despite that Washington had a stalking statute with the reasonable 
person standard that applied to electronic communications, in 2004, the state determined 
that the best way to deal with cyberstalking was to enact a law specifically addressing 
it.112 Other states should follow Washington’s example. 
There are four other states (Florida, Nevada, Delaware, and Virginia) that have 
not enacted specific “cyberstalking” laws, but have amended their statutes in such a way 
so as to include many aspects of cyberstalking.113 The Florida Legislature, for example, 
recognized the dangers of relaxed cyberstalking laws, and amended the Florida stalking 
statute to provide criminal penalties for “the willful, malicious, and repeated following, 
harassing, or cyberstalking of another person.”114 By definition, “cyberstalk” means “to 
engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, 
 
with a reasonable person standard); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West 2005) (cyberstalking); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-9a (LexisNexis 2005) (stalking with reasonable person standard); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 61-3C-14a (LexisNexis 2005) (threatening communications by computer). 
110 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(1)(c)(ii) (West 2005) amended by 2006 Wash. Legis. Serv. Page 
no. 2 (West). 
111 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(2)(b)(4). 
112 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West 2005). 
113 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(c)(2)-(3) (West 2005) (stalking statute specifically amended to define the 
crime of “cyberstalking;” for a misdemeanor charge only, unless coupled with a credible threat); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1311-12 (2005) (for a misdemeanor charge only); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575 
(West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1 (West 2005) (misdemeanor). 
114 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2005).   
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images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic 
communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to 
that person and serving no legitimate purpose.”115 A Florida district court expressly 
noted that the revised stalking/cyberstalking statute was “designed to protect women 
from being harassed…by ensuring that victims did not have to be injured or threatened 
with death before stopping a stalker’s harassment.”116 To fully address the gaps in state 
laws, state stalking statutes should be reviewed accordingly.117 
Although this third group of state laws which overtly deal with cyberstalking is 
clearly a step in the right direction, these statutes have gaps as well.  Few of them 
explicitly address situations where the cyberstalker dupes an “innocent” third party to 
harass.118 The Illinois cyberstalking statute, for example, does not explicitly address 
incitement of third party harassment.119 
Even more problematic are Louisiana’s and North Carolina’s cyberstalking 
statutes, which are almost identical to each other.  Both of these statutes require that the 
harassing electronic communication be sent “to another.”120 Likewise, Mississippi’s 
 
115 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(d). 
116 Lopez v. Lopez, 922 So. 2d 408, 2006 WL 544551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Curry v. State, 811 
So. 2d 736, 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)). 
117 There is also a huge variety among the penalties for cyberstalking.  For example, some statutes that 
could be construed to include cyberstalking are “harassment” statutes instead of “stalking” statutes.  
Generally, penalties for harassment are less than those for stalking.  See Lee, supra note ____, at 380; 
Tucker, supra note ____, at 653.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider what the penalties should 
be to address and deter cyberstalking crimes. 
118 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2005); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West 2005); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575(3) (West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211 (West 2005); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1 (West 2005); see also infra Appendix to this 
article.  But cf. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-13-105 (West 2005) (not a stalking statute, but may apply to 
third party harassment). 
119 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5(b) (West 2005).  The Illinois statute does criminalize a course of 
conduct which “alarms, torments, or terrorizes that person.” Although it has not yet been litigated, it could 
be argued that enticing a third party to “innocently” harass (e.g., posting false advertisements on alternative 
sexual websites) constitutes conduct which “alarms” and “terrorize” the victim. 
120 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.3(b)(2)-(3) (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3(b)(2)-(3) (West 
2005). 
Naomi Goodno 
 Cyberstalking 
- 28 -
cyberstalking statute also seems to suggest that the stalker has to specifically e-mail the 
victim.121 The Florida statute has similar problems since it requires that electronic 
communications be “directed at a specific person.”122 This may mean that the 
communication must be sent directly to the victim.  Such requirements carve out cases 
where cyberstalkers dupe “innocent” third parties to do the harassment for them.  It also 
may not reach cases like the Boyer case where terrifying messages were posted on a 
website, but were never sent directly to her.123 
At the end of the day, only three states (Ohio,124 Rhode Island,125 and 
Washington126) have statutes that explicitly address cases where third parties innocently 
harass the victim at the cyberstalker’s bidding.  Thus, these three state statutes are the 
only current laws that likely deal with all aspects of cyberstalking.127 
In sum, there are at least two ways to enact statutes that would fill the gaps in the 
state laws.  The specific language of the statute that deals with the cyberstalker’s conduct 
should set forth an objective standard which focuses on the victim’s fear, rather than a 
subjective standard which focuses on the perpetrator’s actions.  Thus, cyberstalking 
 
121 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (West 2005). 
122 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(d) (West 2005). 
123 HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 112.    
124 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211(A)(2) (West 2005) (“No person, through the use of any electronic 
method of remotely transferring information, including, but not limited to, any computer, computer 
network, computer program, or computer system, shall post a message with purpose to urge or incite 
another to commit a violation of division (A)(1) of this section.”) (emphasis added).  This form of 
cyberstalking is only a misdemeanor, unless there was an actual threat.  § 2903.211(A)(2)(b).  
125 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2(a) (2004) (“Whoever transmits any communication by computer to any 
person or causes any person to be contacted for the sole purpose of harassing that person or his or her 
family is guilty…”)(emphasis added). 
126 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260(1)(a) (West 2005) (“A person is guilty of cyberstalking if he or she, 
with intent to harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass any other person, and under circumstances not 
constituting telephone harassment, makes an electronic communication to such other person or a third 
party…Using any lewd, lascivious, indecent, or obscene words, images, or language, or suggesting the 
commission of any lewd or lascivious act.”) (emphasis added). 
127 However, even these three laws do not specifically deal with e-mail bombs.  Indeed, there are only three 
different statutes that overtly address e-mail bombs.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 135/1-2(3.1) (West 
2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1027(a)(iii) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260(1)(b) (West 
2005). 
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statutes should adopt a reasonable person standard.128 Another way to address the gaps in 
the state statutes is to enact laws that specifically criminalize conduct where perpetrators 
ruse “innocent” third parties to do the harassment for them. 
The inadequacies of current state cyberstalking stalking laws can be remedied 
foremost by being proactive, rather than a reactive.  It took the Rebecca Schaeffer murder 
to rouse the enactment of stalking statutes.  Hopefully, there does not have to be an 
equivalent cyberstalking case.129 State statutes should be enacted and revised now to deal 
with cyberstalking.   
While many states are taking active steps to combat the problem of cyberstalking, 
there is a complete lack of uniformity in defining the crime.  Conduct in one state that is 
criminal, may not be so in another.130 Moreover, there are instances where state laws 
may not be able reach the conduct at all – namely, where a stalker uses the Internet to 
stalk a victim in another state.  In such instances, federal laws are paramount; however, 
they too have gaps. 
b. Addressing the Gaps in Federal Laws 
There are three current federal laws which are applicable to cyberstalking. 
However, each of these laws as currently interpreted, may fall short of adequately 
prosecuting cyberstalkers.  This next section takes each of the three federal statutes, 
 
128 Some cyberstalking statutes have adopted a related standard that is just as effective.  A few statutes 
criminalize conduct that causes the victim to suffer substantial or severe emotional distress.  See, e.g., N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-277.3 (West 2005).  This standard will work in cyberstalking cases because, like the 
reasonable person standard, the focus is on the fear instilled in the victim, rather than the cyberstalker’s 
conduct. 
129 “[C]yberstalking does not end in cyberspace, but usually transcends into real life.”  Lee, supra note 
____, at 407. 
130 See Walsh, supra note ____, at 386-87 (“In many cases, this ambiguity [in offline stalking laws] actually 
allowed offenders to ‘slip through the cracks’ of justice, by permitting the judicial system to vindicate only 
the rights of those stalking victims who fell prey to behavior criminalized in that particular state.  Persons 
who engaged in behavior that would be characterized as stalking suffered no legal consequences when that 
behavior was not statutorily criminalized.”). 
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explains the law as applied to cyberstalking and considers whether they are inadequate to 
deal with the crime.  
 1. Gaps in the Interstate Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 
 The Interstate Communications Act makes it a crime punishable by five years in 
prison to transmit “any communication” in interstate commerce containing “any threat” 
to injure another person.131 “Any communication” includes threats transmitted across 
state lines via the telephone, e-mail, beepers, or the Internet.132 This statute successfully 
prosecuted at least one cyberstalker who used the Internet to send threatening e-mail 
messages.133 
However, the requirement that the communication contain a “threat” is where this 
statute falls short because it is akin to a “credible threat” requirement.  Thus, the statute 
would not be applicable to a cyberstalker who, absent a specific threat, uses the Internet 
to engage in a pattern of conduct intended to harass or annoy another.   
United States v. Alkhabaz134 is a prime example of why the “threat” requirement is 
problematic.  In this case, the defendant e-mailed numerous messages to an acquaintance 
that included violent sexual fantasies about women and young girls.  The defendant 
eventually posted an explicitly “depraved torture-and-snuff story” on a chat room where 
the rape-victim had the same name as one of his classmates.135 Despite the sadistic story 
 
131 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006). 
132 Id. 
133 See United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding the defendant’s conviction 
even though the defendant sent the e-mail messages to the victim who was in the same state because the e-
mail message was sent via interstate telephone lines). 
134 United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).  
135 Id. at 1498 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). 
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about the defendant’s classmate, the court held that he was not in violation of § 875(c), 
because he did not make a “communication containing a true threat.”136 
Because this statute is limited to only those cyberstalking cases where there has 
been a “true” (e.g. credible) threat, it does not address the many situations where the 
cyberstalker engages in conduct intended to harass the victim, but without making 
explicit threats. 
2. Gaps in the Federal Telephone Harassment Statute, 47 U.S.C. § 223. 
The Telephone Harassment Statute137 was passed in 1934 — a time when the 
telephone, much like the Internet now, was the cutting edge technology of 
communication.  The statute makes it a crime, punishable by up to two years in prison, to 
anonymously and knowingly make a telephone call, or use a “telecommunications 
device,” “to annoy, abuse, harass, or threaten” a person.138 
Very recently, in January 2006, the federal government attempted to respond to 
the cyberstalking problem by trying to ensure that e-mail messages sent via the Internet 
were covered by § 223.  In the voluminous “Violence Against Women Act” a section 
entitled, “Preventing Cyberstalking,”139 amended the statute140 to apply to e-mail 
messages.141 Specifically, the definition of the “telecommunications device” was 
changed to include “any device or software that can be used to originate 
 
136 Id. at 1497. 
137 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006). 
138 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C). 
139 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 
Title I, § 113, 119 Stat. 2987 (2006) [hereinafter Violence Against Women Act].  As the Summary of the act 
explains, “(Sec. 113) Amends the Communications Act of 1934 to apply the prohibitions against certain 
communications in interstate of foreign commerce to communications transmitted by the Internet (i.e., 
cyberstalking).”  Id. at 2. 
140 The House approved it by voice vote, and the Senate unanimously approved it on December 16, 2005.  
See Declan McCullagh, Create an E-annoyance, Go to Jail, http:news.com.com/Create+an+e-
annoyance%2C+go+jail/2010-1028_3-6022491.html. 
141 Violence Against Women Act, supra note ____. 
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telecommunications or other types of communications that are transmitted, in whole or in 
part, by the Internet.”142 
While the amendment changed the definition of a “telecommunications device” to 
specifically include e-mail,143 it did not change any of the required elements.  Thus, for 
the statute to be triggered, the cyberstalker would still have to anonymously and 
knowingly send a message via the Internet “to annoy, abuse, harass or threaten” a 
person.144 The amendment has created some controversy.  Proponents call it an answer to 
many victims’ cries for “help.”145 But, some critics have complained that the term 
“annoy” is too overbroad because it “might characterize a wide range of anonymous 
Internet banter that falls far short of cyberstalking.”146 
However, it seems unlikely that the amendment would create any constitutional 
problems that the courts have not already dealt with.  For example, in United States v. 
Bowker,147 the Sixth Circuit found that the word “annoy” in the statute was not 
unconstitutional because: (1) it upheld Congressional intent to “protect innocent 
individuals from fear” without being vague or overbroad; and (2) it did not chill political 
 
142 Id. (adding this language to 47 U.S.C. § 223h(3)(C)). 
143 Even without this amendment, the courts may have interpreted the Internet as a “telecommunication 
device.”  See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 828-29 (E.D. Pa 1996) (“Clearly, the 
sponsors of the CDA [47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)] thought it would reach individual Internet users, many of 
whom still connect through modems.”) (citing 141 Cong.Rec. S8329-46 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) 
(statements of Sen. Exon and Sen. Coats)).  
144 47 U.S.C. § 223a(1)(C). 
145 Dalton Jr., supra note ____ (citing a spokesman from the offices of the Washington Congressman Rep. 
Jim McDermott who joined in sponsoring the amendment to the Telephone Harassment Statute). 
146 Tom Zeller, Jr., A Sinister Web Entraps Victims of Cyberstalkers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006.  See also 
Dalton Jr., supra note ____ (explaining that a Website, TheAnonymousE-mail.com, which allows users to 
send anonymous messages, has filed a challenge to the amendment); K.C. Jones, Cyberstalking Law 
Targets E-Mail, but Could Chill Bloggers,
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=177103642; McCullagh, supra note 
____ (quoting an ACLU representative, “The use of the word ‘annoy’ is particularly problematic . . . 
What’s annoying to one person may not be annoying to someone else.”). 
147 United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2004) remanded on other grounds in United States v. 
Bowker, 125 Fed. Appx. 701 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding criminal convictions, but remanded to district 
court for re-sentencing).  See also United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783 (3rd Cir. 1978) (upholding 
constitutionality of the statute). 
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or free speech.148 Although Bowker was decided prior to the amendment to § 223, the 
analysis is the same.  Read in context, “annoy,” like “threaten” and “harass,” is not 
unconstitutional because its purpose is to prohibit messages aimed at instilling fear — 
whether the message is sent via the telephone or the Internet.   
This amendment to § 223 is a step in the right direction since it is evidence that 
Congress has specifically recognized cyberstalking as a problem.  However, even with 
the amendment, § 223 is still inadequate to fully deal with cyberstalking for three 
reasons.  First, the identity of the person sending the message must be anonymous.149 It 
seems odd to only make cyberstalking a crime where the identity of the cyberstalker is 
unknown.150 This element seemingly, and without reason, carves out a number of 
terrifying cases where the victim knows the identity of the cyberstalker. 
 Second, the statute applies only to direct communications between the stalker and 
victim — e.g., the statute would only be triggered when the cyberstalker sends an e-mail 
directly to the victim.151 Thus, the amended statute is inadequate to deal with behavior 
where the cyberstalker indirectly harasses or terrorizes his victim by posting messages on 
 
148 The court explained that the word “annoy” standing alone might pose vagueness concerns.  But, the 
“statutory language must be read in the context of Congressional intent to protect innocent individuals from 
fear, abuse or annoyance at the hands of persons who employ the telephone, not to communicate, but for 
other unjustifiable motives.  This context suggests that the words annoy, abuse, threaten or harass should be 
read together to be given similar meanings.”  Bowker, 372 F.3d. at 382-83 (internal citations omitted).  
Thus, “[A]ny vagueness associated with the word ‘annoy’ is mitigated by the fact that the meanings of 
‘threaten’ and ‘harass’ can easily be ascertained and have generally accepted meanings.”  Id. The court 
went on to explain that the statute did not violate the freedom of speech because the “thrust of the statute is 
to prohibit communications intended to instill fear in the victim, not to provoke a discussion about political 
issues of the day.”  Id. at 379. 
149 42 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2006).  See also Jones, supra note ____ (citing Jeff Lundgren, 
communications director for the U.S. House Judiciary Committee, who states that the amendment “doesn’t 
target any Internet except e-mail”). 
150 However, one court has held that the lack of the anonymity element made a state statute unconstitutional 
under the New Hampshire State Constitution.  See New Hampshire v. Brobst, 857 A.2d 1253 (N.H. 2004) 
(note, this case did not deal with the constitutionality of the statute under the U.S. Constitution).   
151 42 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
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a bulletin board, creating a Website aimed at terrorizing his victim, or encouraging third 
parties to harass the victim.  
Finally, the statute limits cyberstalking to the maximum punishment of two years 
in prison.152 While there may be cyberstalking cases where the actions merit a sentence 
of only two years, there are certainly federal statutes that make offline stalking 
punishable by five years to life imprisonment.153 It is not clear why there should be such 
low limits on the punishment of a crime under this statute.  
Thus, the statute, even with the amendment, fails to fully combat all of the 
criminal vices of cyberstalking.   
 3. Gaps in the Federal Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 2261A. 
The most promising federal statute to combat cyberstalking, is the “Interstate 
Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act.”154 The statute was passed in 1996 and was the 
first federal law to deal specifically with stalking (and, at that time, specifically offline 
stalking).  Initially, there were three elements to the statute: (1) the defendant had to 
“travel across state lines” (2) and intentionally “engage in a course of conduct” using 
“mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce” (3) that placed a person in 
“reasonable fear of death” or of “serious bodily injury.”155 There have been two recent 
amendments to this statute that makes it applicable to some forms of cyberstalking.   
The first amendment passed in 2000, changed the first element of the statute 
dealing with jurisdiction.  The statute was formerly only triggered when a stalker 
 
152 42 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (2006). 
153 See The Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A (2006); 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2261(b) (2006) (setting forth the penalties for violating § 2261A). 
15418 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006). 
155 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1), (2)(A)-(B) (1996). 
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physically traveled “across state lines,” which obviously posed a problem in 
cyberstalking cases since a cyberstalker can harass his victim without even walking out 
of his front door, let alone travel across state lines.  However, the 2000 amendment 
changed the applicability of the statute from a person who physically travels to a person 
who “travels in interstate or foreign commerce.”156 While it has not been specifically 
litigated whether traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of the statute 
encompasses the Internet, there has been one Sixth Circuit case since the amendment 
where the defendant was charged with online stalking under § 2261A; 157 however, in that 
case, the defendant had traveled across state lines.158 
The second amendment to § 2261A occurred recently in January 2006. 159 The 
“Violence Against Women Act” (the same act that amended the Telephone Harassment 
Statute) added language to both the second and third elements criminalizing a course of 
conduct where the stalker “uses any interactive computer service” that causes “substantial 
emotional harm.” 160 The new language of the statute has not yet been litigated, but it is 
arguable that “interactive computer service” reaches cases in which cyberstalkers use the 
computer to send e-mail messages (anonymous or not) or post messages on blogs or 
Websites.  
 
156 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Div. B, Title I, § 
1107(b)(1), 114 Stat. 1498 (2000). 
157 In Bowker, the defendant was charged with “Count 2 (cyberstalking),” which alleged “that between 
December 25, 2000 and August 18, 2001 Bowker, located in Ohio, knowingly and repeatedly used the 
Internet to engage in a course of conduct that intentionally placed Knight, then located in West Virginia, in 
reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2).”  United States v. 
Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 377, n.2 (6th Cir. 2004) (distinguished on other grounds).   
158 Id. at 374.   
159 Violence Against Women Act, supra note ____. 
160 Id. 
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Thus, the newly amended § 2261A address many of the shortcomings of the other 
federal statutes.  It does not have a “true/credible threat” requirement;161 but rather adopts 
a standard that measures the victim’s “reasonable fear” or “substantial emotional 
harm.”162 Nor does it limit coverage of the “use” of the computer to only anonymous e-
mail messages.163 
However, § 2261A still falls short of completely addressing the cyberstalking 
problem.  The statute does not squarely deal with situations where the cyberstalker 
pretends to be the victim and encourages third parties to innocently harass the victim — 
such as posting sexual invitations on a message board in the name of the victim to dupe 
third parties to respond. 
The bottom line is that the current federal laws are not able to deal with all the 
criminal aspects of cyberstalking.  But they should.  Particularly because of the 
jurisdictional problems that cyberstalking creates.  And, the evidence to prosecute the 
cyberstalkers, or even find them, may be with Internet providers in all different 
jurisdictions.  Better federal laws will give the federal authorities the necessary tools to 
control and combat cyberstalking. 
c.   Potential Statutory Barriers 
In addition to gaps in the state and federal laws, there may also be barriers in 
combating the cyberstalking problem.  In particular, the problems that plague the 
codification of cyberstalking could also create significant difficulties for victims 
attempting to obtain protective orders against cyberstalkers. The main reason for this 
problem is that often the statutory definition of “stalking” governs the issuance of 
 
161 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006).  
162 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1), (2)(A)-(B) (2006). 
163 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2261(B) with 42 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2006).   
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protective orders.164 Thus, where the language of the statute does not cover 
cyberstalking, it may be difficult to obtain a protective order.  Also, the application 
procedure for a protective order may call for information that is difficult or impossible to 
obtain due to the anonymous nature of a cyberstalker.165 
In Virginia, for example, the law provides that a Stalking Protective Order may be 
issued after a criminal conviction for stalking.166 Alternatively, the victim would have to 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the perpetrator is guilty of stalking.167 
This may pose a problem in cyberstalking cases, because it is unlikely that the Virginia 
stalking statute covers cases where the cyberstalkers entice third party harassment.168 In 
fact, is unclear if Virginia’s stalking statute specifically covers electronic 
communications.169 Thus, cyberstalking victims may have to wait until the cyberstalker 
is formally prosecuted before they can secure any sort of protective order.170 
164 See generally Lowell T. Woods, Note, Anti-Stalker Legislation:  A Legislative Attempt to Surmount the 
Inadequacies of Protective Orders, 27 IND. L.J. 449 (1993). 
165 For example, to file a Petition for Order of Protection in Indiana, the victim must know (1) the correct 
name of the cyberstalker, (2) either their date or birth or their social security number, and (3) a correct, 
current address.  See Ind. Code Ann. § 34-26-5 (West 2006), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/forms/po/po/po-
0102.doc  The anonymity of the Internet may make it difficult under such a statute to procure all this 
detailed information; thus, a cyberstalking victim may be unable to receive any official protection from the 
stalking.  
166 See Domestic Violence and Family Abuse, 
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/jdr/Lynchburg/violence.html#ppo. 
167 Id.  
168 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (West 2005). 
169 Id.  See infra Appendix to this Article. 
170 There are other examples where it would be hard for cyberstalking victims to obtain protective orders.  
In Las Vegas, victims may apply for a protective order only if they are either (1) related by blood or 
marriage to the stalker, (2) have been in a dating relationship with or been a roommate of the stalker, or (3) 
have children with the stalker. See Las Vegas Domestic Violence Unit, 
http://www.lvmpd.com/Bureaus_and_Staff/Domestic_Violence/Protective_Orders.html.  Likewise in 
Texas, to obtain a protective order, the victim and the offender must be (1) related by blood or marriage, (2) 
living together, or previously lived together, or (3) have a child together. The protective order is defined in 
terms of family violence, and makes no mention of resources for cyberstalking.  See Attorney General of 
Texas, http://www.oag.state.tx.us/victims/protective.shtml#law.  In Maryland, victims must prove that an 
act occurred that caused them to fear imminent bodily harm (e.g, a credible threat) or prove criminal 
stalking to obtain a peace or protective order.  See Protective Orders, 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/courtforms/joint/ccdcdv01br.pdf.   
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Federal stalking laws pose similar problems.  In the last decade, federal 
congressional bills have been introduced, but not passed, that would require protective 
orders be issued upon conviction of stalking.171 The Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Act, which partially strengthened existing federal laws concerning cyberstalking, failed to 
retain the requirement that protective orders be issued upon conviction.  Indeed, that Act 
did not address issues related to protective orders in cyberstalking cases at all.172 Thus, a 
cyberstalking victim may not be able to obtain a proactive order via current federal laws.  
Another potential issue concerns how a cyberstalker subscribes to the Internet.  
For instance, the Federal Cable Communications Policy Act prohibits the disclosure of 
cable subscriber records to law enforcement agencies without a court order and advance 
notice to the subscriber.173 Potentially this means that if the perpetrator uses a cable 
connection (as opposed to a dial-up connection via the telephone lines) to access the 
Internet, law enforcement agents have to notify the potential cyberstalker before being 
able to access computer records (e.g., evidence that would be crucial to prosecuting a 
cyberstalker).  Although it has not been litigated in a cyberstalking case, it seems as 
though the Patriot Act would likely give the court some leeway in allowing the 
government to access cable records without first notifying the cyberstalker.174 
171 H.R. 3747, 105th Cong (1998); H.R. 1869, 106th Cong. (1999). 
172 See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Div. B, Title I, § 
1107(b)(1), 114 Stat. 1498 (2000). 
173 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551(h) (2006). 
174 See, e.g., Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001); In re Application of the United States for an 
Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(D) Directed to Cablevision Sys. Corp. 1111 Steward Ave. Bethpage, 
N.Y. 11714, 158 F. Supp. 2d 644 (2001). In In re Application, the court ruled that the part of CCPA that 
required cable operators to give advance notice to their subscribers before revealing their information to the 
government was repealed by implication by the more recent Electronic Communications Privacy Act.  See 
In re Application, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 648; 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).  Although In re Application was not a 
cyberstalking case, it seems as though the same argument could be applied.  Moreover, since this case, the 
Patriot Act has come on the scene.  Although it has not yet been litigated, the Patriot Act appears to be an 
even broader abolition of the CCPA requirement.  The Patriot Act specifically amended the language in 
subsection (c)(2)(D) of the CCPA, which effectively allows the government to obtain information without a 
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IV. Problems with Criminalizing Cyberstalking
There are at least two potential concerns related to criminalizing cyberstalking. 
a. Constitutional Considerations 
 As with offline harassment laws, cyberstalking laws need to be relatively broad to 
be effective.  However, they cannot be so broad as to impinge upon the rights of free 
speech protected under the First Amendment.  Thus, any interpretation of existing 
harassment laws and changes in stalking statutes should keep in mind that, as with offline 
stalking, cyberstalking should generally involve conduct reasonably understood to 
constitute harassing and threatening behavior.175 
Court rulings regarding the constitutionality of telephone harassment laws give 
guidance.  Constitutional concerns are not implicated when statutes prohibit the matter 
and means of the telephone call and have an element of specific intent to harass the 
person called.  Thus, telephone harassment statutes that have a specific intent element are 
constitutional when they prohibit repeated, anonymous, or late-night calls.176 Likewise, 
statutes related to cyberstalking should focus on specific intent, conduct-based behavior 
such as repeated transmission of e-mails (e-mail “letter bombs”) or use of lewd language 
with the intent to harass.177 
court order.  See Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 211; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 119, 121, 206 (2006) 
(These chapters include all sections of the code for Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and 
Interception of Oral Communications; Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional 
Records Access; and Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices).  Therefore, the Patriot Act has given the 
government more leeway in obtaining subscriber information from cable providers by getting rid of the 
court order, and In re Application might allow for this information to be gathered without notification to the 
subscriber even if a court order is sought. 
 
175 See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that the Internet is an 
important tool for protected speech activities); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
176 Lisa A. Karczewski, Stalking in Cyberspace: The Expansion of California’s Current Anti-Stalking Laws 
in the Age of the Internet, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 517 (1999). 
177 Karczewski, supra note ____, at 517. 
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Thus, as long as statutes aimed at cyberstalking contain the following two 
elements, it will probably not be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad: (1) “willfully” 
harasses, follows, engages in conduct, etc. ensures that the perpetrator has the requisite 
specific intent to commit a crime, and (2) an provision stating that the law does not 
include “constitutionally protected activity”, including, but not limited to “picketing and 
organized protests.”178 Moreover, many current offline stalking statutes contain specific 
language that the statute cannot violate constitutional rights. 179 This may be another 
element that should be included in newly enacted cyberstalking statutes.   
b. Lack of Cyberstalking Data 
 Second, evidence of whether cyberstalking is indeed becoming a societal problem 
is largely anecdotal and informal.  In fact, law enforcement agencies from different 
jurisdictions report widely different statistics on stalking via the Internet.  However, those 
jurisdictions that have computer crime departments tend to report a larger number of 
cyberstalking incidents.180 The lack of data is partly because many cyberstalking victims 
do not report the conduct to law enforcement, and partly because law enforcement 
agencies have not had adequate training in how to deal with it.181 However, there are 
some reports that suggest that cyberstalking is ever growing. The CyberAngels, a non-
 
178 Tucker, supra note ____, at 622, 630-31. 
179 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-92 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7906(2)(a) (2005); IND. CODE ANN. §
35-45-10-1 (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.130(1)(b)(2) (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
17-A, § 210-A(2)(A) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107 (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 (West 
2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-311.02(1) (2005); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 200.575(6)(e) (West 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:3-a(II)(a) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-3A-4 (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(a), (5) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
163.755 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (2004) (cyberstalking statute); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
22-19A-5 (2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-9a(h) (LexisNexis 2005). 
180 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note ____, at 12.   
181 Id..
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profit organization that assists cyberstalking victims,182 estimates that there are 
approximately 63,000 Internet stalkers in the United States and 474,000 victims world-
wide.183 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As technology changes, so do the laws.  For example, with the increased and daily 
use of cars, the laws had to change to make driving under the influence of alcohol a 
crime.  Similarly, the stalking and harassment laws should be reviewed to ensure that 
they are adequate to address the new crime of cyberstalking.   
Cyberstalking is a crime with issues that are distinct from offline stalking such that 
current state and federal laws are inadequate to deal with all aspects of cyberstalking.  
Thus, cyberstalking laws should be enacted that have the reasonable person standard and 
also explicitly deal with situations where the cyberstalker dupes “innocent” third parties 
to do the stalking. 
Clear federal and state laws which specifically prohibit cyberstalking may address 
this problem.  If victims knew of the laws, they might be more encouraged to report 
incidents.  And, if cyberstalkers knew of the laws, they might be less likely to stalk 
victims online.  Moreover, clear cyberstalking laws would give guidance to law 
enforcement agencies on how to appropriately respond to reported incidents.  
 
APPENDIX (starts on next page)
 
182 The CyberAngels Website is at www.cyberangels.org. 
183 Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note ____, at 2. 
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APPENDIX: STATE STATUTES
Alabama Alabama Alaska Alaska Arizona
Code ALA. CODE § 13A-11-
8(b)(1) (2005).
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90
(2005).
ALASKA STAT. §§
11.41.260 to 41.270
(2004).
ALASKA STAT. §
11.61.120(a)(4) (2004).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2921 (2005).
Title Harassing
Communications
(misdemeanor)
Stalking
(felony)
1st Degree Stalking
2nd Degree Stalking
Harassment Harassment
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Yes, but requires a
“threat”
Yes, but requires a
“credible threat.” See
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-
92(b) (2005).
No No Yes
“Conduct directed at a
specific person which
would cause a
reasonable person to be
seriously alarmed,
annoyed or harassed and
the conduct in fact
seriously alarms, annoys
or harasses the person.”
Credible Threat
Standard?
Requires a “threat” Yes No Yes, requires a “threat”
of physical injury or
sexual contact
No
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
No No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Yes
“Communicates with a
person, anonymously or
otherwise, by telephone,
mail, or any other form
of written or electronic
communication”
No Yes, but only covers
“electronic
communications” to
victim. See ALASKA
STAT. §§ 11.41.260 to
41.270(3)(f) (2004).
Yes, but only to
“electronic
communications” to
victim
Yes
Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems in
prosecuting
cyberstalking
1. Requires a threat.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. Requires a threat.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May only apply to e-
mail sent directly to the
victim, not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May only apply to e-
mail sent directly to the
victim, not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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Arizona Arkansas Arkansas Arkansas California
Code ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-2923 (2005).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
71-229 (West 2005).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
71-209(a)(1) (West
2005).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
41-108(a)(1)(A)-(D)
(West 2005).
CAL. PENAL CODE §
646.9 (West 2005).
Title Stalking Stalking
(felony)
Harassing
Communications
(misdemeanor)
Unlawful Computerized
Communications
(misdemeanor)
Stalking
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Yes, but only when the
conduct includes repeatedly
maintaining a visual or
physical proximity to a
person, otherwise a threat is
required.
No No No Yes, but also requires a
credible threat
Credible Threat
Standard?
Sometimes
Conduct includes
repeatedly maintaining a
visual or physical proximity
to a person conveying
verbal or written threats or
threats implied by conduct.
Yes
“Terrorist threat”
No, requires intent to
annoy
Sometimes
“Message threatens to
cause injury to any
person or damage to any
property of any person
or uses obscene, lewd,
or profane language”
Yes
“Verbal or written threat
including electronic
statements and conduct,
combined with a pattern
of conduct intending to
cause fear, and made
with the apparent ability
to carry out the threat as
to cause the target to
reasonably fear for her
safety or her family’s
safety”
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
No No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Not specifically, but does
cover “written threats.”
Not specifically Not specifically, but
does apply to any “form
of written
communication” to the
victim.
Yes, but only applies to
“computerized
communications” sent
to the victim
Yes
Includes computers
defined by 18 U.S.C. §
2510(12) (2006).
Notes Requires an actual threat
when the perpetrator is not
physical pursuit.
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. Requires an actual threat
when the perpetrator is not
physically pursuing the
victim.
2. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. Requires a threat.
2. May not cover
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May only apply to
messages sent directly
to the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May only apply to
messages sent directly
to the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. Requires a credible
threat.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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California Colorado Colorado Connecticut Connecticut
Code CAL. PENAL CODE §
653m (West 2005).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-9-111(1)(e) (West
2005).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-
13-105 (West 2005).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-181c (West
2005).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-181d (West
2005).
Title Telephone Calls or
Contact by Electronic
Communication
Device with Intent to
Annoy
(misdemeanor)
Harassment — Stalking Criminal Libel
(felony)
1st Deg. Stalking
(felony)
2nd Deg. Stalking
(misdemeanor)
Reasonable Person
Standard?
No Yes (Stalking)
No (Harassment)
No Yes Yes
Credible Threat
Standard?
No, requires intent to
annoy
Yes (Stalking)
No (Harassment)
No No No
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
No No No Yes
“follows or lies in wait”
Yes
“follows or lies in wait”
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Yes, but only applies
to “contact” with the
victim
Possibly (Stalking)
Yes (Harassment)
Computer, computer
network, or computer
system
Not specifically, but applies to
“written instrument”
No No
Notes The statute specifically
notes seriousness of
stalking. See § 18-9-
111(4)(a).
Standard: “A person who shall
knowingly publish or
disseminate, either by written
instrument, sign, pictures, or
the like, any statement or
object tending…to impeach the
honesty, integrity, virtue, or
reputation. . .of one who is
alive, and thereby to expose
him to public hatred, contempt,
or ridicule, commits criminal
libel.”
Potential Statutory
Problems
1 Reasonable
standard would be
more applicable.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
1. This is not a stalking
statute, but might be
interpreted to cover “innocent”
third party harassment, if
“public hatred” includes the
Internet.
2. Electronic communications
are not specifically covered.
1. Electronic
communications are not
specifically covered.
2. Requires physical
pursuit, which would
not include many
aspects of cyberstalking.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. Electronic
communications are not
covered.
2. Requires physical
pursuit, which would
not include many
aspects of cyberstalking.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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Connecticut Connecticut Connecticut Delaware Delaware
Code CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-181e (West
2005).
CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-182b
(West 2005).
CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-183
(West 2005).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
1312A (2005).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§
1311-12 (2005).
Title 3rd Deg. Stalking
(misdemeanor)
1st Deg. Harassment
(felony)
2nd Deg. Harassment
(misdemeanor)
Stalking
(felony or misdemeanor)
Harassment
(misdemeanor)
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Yes No No Sometimes
Only when the conduct
includes repeatedly
maintaining a visual or
physical proximity to a
person, otherwise a threat is
required
Yes
2004 amendment added the
phrase, “or cause a
reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional
distress”
Credible Threat
Standard?
No Yes
“he threatens to kill
or physically injure”
No Sometimes
Either physical proximity or
threat
No
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Yes
“follows or lies in wait”
No No Sometimes
Either proximity or a threat
No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
No Yes
Covers “computer
network”
Yes No Yes
Communicate with a person
by electronic communication
in a manner which the person
knows is likely to cause
annoyance or alarm
Notes Broad statute
covering
communications
made “in a manner
likely to
cause annoyance or
alarm.”
For a misdemeanor charge,
the statute is broad covering
any “course of alarming or
distressing conduct which
serves no legitimate
purpose;” the language is
narrower for a felony charge.
Compare § 1311 with § 1312.
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. Electronic
communications are not
explicitly covered.
2. Requires physical
pursuit, which would
not include many
aspects of
cyberstalking.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
1. Requires direct
contact with the
victim.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May only apply to
messages sent
directly to the victim
(e-mail), not other
Internet postings.
1. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
2. Requires a threat when
the perpetrator is not
physically pursuing the
victim.
3. May only apply to
messages sent directly to the
victim (e-mail), not other
Internet postings.
1. For a felony charge, it
may not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
2. For a felony charge, it
may only apply to messages
sent directly to the victim (e-
mail), not other Internet
postings.
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District of
Columbia
Florida Florida Georgia Georgia
Code D.C. CODE § 22-
404 (2005).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West
2005).
FLA. STAT. ANN. §
836.10 (West 2005).
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-
90 (West 2005).
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
5-91 (West 2005).
Title Assault or
Threatened Assault
in a Menacing
Manner —
Stalking
Stalking Harassment Stalking
(misdemeanor)
Aggravated Stalking
(felony)
Reasonable
Person
Standard?
Yes Yes
But, for a felony charge requires a
credible threat.
No Yes
Conduct that
“harass[es] or
intimidat[es].” § 16-5-
90(a).
No
Credible
Threat
Standard?
No No - misdemeanor stalking
Yes - felony stalking
Yes No No
Requires
Actual Physical
Pursuit?
No No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communic-
ations?
Unclear, does not
specify how the
communication
must be made
Yes Not specifically, but
does cover “inscribed
communication”
Yes Yes
Notes Section 784.048(1)(d) specifically
includes cyberstalking (amended 2003)
§- "’Cyberstalk’ means to engage in a
course of conduct to communicate, or
to cause to be communicated, words,
images, or language by or through the
use of electronic mail or electronic
communication, directed at a specific
person, causing substantial emotional
distress to that person and serving no
legitimate purpose.”
Computer and computer
network defined by GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-9-92
(West 2005) (added
2000); contact occurs at
the place or places
where the
communication is
received
Potential
Statutory
Problems
1. Unclear if
electronic
communications
are covered.
2. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.
Florida has a model statute that seems
to cover most aspects of cyberstalking;
unclear if “directed at a specific
person” limits the statute’s reach to
communications sent directly to the
victim.
1. Unclear if electronic
communications are
covered.
2. Requires a credible
threat.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
1. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
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Hawaii Hawaii Idaho Illinois Illinois
Code HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
711-1106.4 to -1106.5
(LexisNexis 2005).
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 711-1106 (LexisNexis
2005).
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-
7905 to -7906 (2005).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West
2005).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
135/1-2 (West 2005).
Title Harassment by Stalking
Aggravated Harassment by
Stalking
Harassment 1st Deg. Stalking
2nd Deg. Stalking
Cyberstalking
(felony)
Harassment Through
Electronic Communications
Reasonable Person
Standard?
No Yes Yes Yes (either reasonable
person or credible
threat)
No, but has broad standard
that covers the intent “to
harass”
Credible Threat
Standard?
No Not specifically, but see
“Notes”
No Yes (either reasonable
person or credible
threat)
Yes (either intent to harass
or direct threat)
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Sometimes
Either pursuit, or non-
consensual contact —
No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Yes
Non-consensual contact
includes contact via e-mail
transmission; amended in
2003
Yes
Repeatedly makes e-
mail transmissions
without legitimate
purpose
Yes
Nonconsensual conduct
includes but is not limited
to sending electronic
communications
Yes Yes
Same as 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West
2005).
Notes Aggravated harassment by
stalking requires a current
and prior conviction for the
offense of harassment by
stalking
Must prove the victim
reasonably believed that
defendant intended to
cause bodily injury. See
State v. Bush, 50 P.3d
428 (Haw. Ct. App.
2002).
Course of conduct
involved “nonconsensual
contact.” IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-7906(2)(a)
(2005).
May apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass since statute is
broadly written to
include a “course of
conduct” “that alarms,
torments, or terrorizes
that person.” § 5/12-
7.5(b).
Statute prohibits knowingly
inducing a person to
transmit a harassing
message to a person under
13. See § 135/1-2(3.1).
Note this requires direct
communication with the
victim.
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May require threat.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not other
Internet postings.
Illinois has a model
statute that seems to
cover most aspects of
cyberstalking.
Illinois has a model statute
that seems to cover most
aspects of cyberstalking,
including e-mail bombs.
See § 135/1-2(3).
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Indiana Indiana Iowa Iowa Kansas
Code IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
45-10-1, -5 (West
2005).
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
45-2-2 (West 2005).
IOWA CODE ANN. §
708.7 (West 2005).
IOWA CODE ANN. §
708.11 (West 2005).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3438 (West 2005).
Title Stalking
(felony)
Harassment
(misdemeanor)
Harassment Stalking Stalking
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Yes No, but has broad
standard that covers the
intent “to harass”
No, but has broad
standard that covers the
intent “to harass”
Yes, but requires a
threat. See §
708.11(1)(b), 2(a).
No
Credible Threat
Standard?
Yes, for a felony. See
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
45-10-5(b)(1)(B).
No Yes, for first and second
degree harassment
No, for third degree
harassment
Yes, either visual
proximity or threat
Yes
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
No No No Yes, either visual
proximity or threat
No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Yes Yes
Computer network is
defined in IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-43-2-3(a)
(West 2005).
Yes Not specifically Yes
Electronic
communication
includes, but is not
limited to, computers
and computer networks
Notes Sometimes requires
personal contact — an
encounter where two or
more people are in
visual or physical
proximity to each other;
personal contact does
not require a physical
touching or
communication
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
2. Requires a threat for
conduct to be a felony.
1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
§ 35-45-2-2(a)(4)(A)-
(B).
1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
2. May only apply to
direct communication
with the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings. § 708.7
1(a)(1).
1. Requires a threat.
2. May not cover
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. Requires a threat.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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Kentucky Kentucky Louisiana Louisiana Maine Maryland
Code KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 508.130-
.150 (West 2005).
KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 525.080
(West 2005).
LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:40.2
(2005).
LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:40.3
(2005).
ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, §§
210-210-A (2005).
MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 3-805
(West 2005).
Title 1st Deg. Stalking
2nd Deg. Stalking
Harassing
Communications
(misdemeanor)
Stalking Cyberstalking Terrorizing (§ 210)
Stalking (§ 210A)
Misuse of
Electronic Mail
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Yes, but also
requires an explicit
threat
No, but has broad
standard that covers
the intent “to
harass”
Yes No, but has broad
standard that covers
the intent “to
harass”
Yes, but requires
threat.
No
Credible Threat
Standard?
Yes No No No Yes
Conduct requires
either visual
proximity or a threat
No
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
No No No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
No Yes Unclear Yes Yes Yes
E-mail means
transmission by
computer or other
electronic means
received by a person
with a unique
address
Notes Similar to North
Carolina’s
cyberstalking statute
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. Requires a threat.
2. May not cover
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (e-
mail), not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May not cover
electronic
communications.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
Louisiana has a
model statute, but it
is not explicitly
clear whether it
applies when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.
1. Requires a threat.
2. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (e-
mail), not other
Internet postings.
3. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. Only applies to
direct contact with
the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
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Maryland Maryland Massachusetts Massachusetts Michigan
Code MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 3-802 (West
2005)
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 3-803 (West
2005).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 265, § 43 (West
2005).
MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 265, § 43A
(West 2005).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.411h-i (West 2005).
Title Stalking Harassment
(misdemeanor)
Stalking Criminal Harassment Stalking (misdemeanor)
Aggravated Stalking
(felony)
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Yes No, but has broad
standard that covers the
intent “to harass”
Yes, but requires a
threat
Yes Yes (Stalking)
No (Aggravated Stalking)
Credible Threat
Standard?
No No Yes No No (Stalking)
Yes (Aggravated Stalking)
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Yes
Approaching or
pursuing another
No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
No Unclear Yes Yes Yes
Non-consensual conduct
includes sending mail or
electronic communications
Notes Requires that stalker be
warned/asked to stop
conduct
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. Electronic
communications are not
explicitly covered.
2. Requires physical
pursuit, which would
not include many
aspects of cyberstalking.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. Electronic
communications are not
explicitly covered.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. Requires a threat.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May only apply to
direct contact with
the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May only apply to direct
“contact” with the victim
(e-mail), not other Internet
postings. § 750.411h(1)(c).
2. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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Minnesota Mississippi Mississippi Mississippi Missouri Montana
Code MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.749 (West 2005).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
3-107 (West 2005).
MISS. CODE ANN. §§
97-3-85, 97-29-45
(West 2005).
MISS. CODE ANN. §
97-45-15 (West
2005).
MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.225 (West
2005).
MONT. CODE ANN. §
45-5-220 (2005).
Title Harassment — Stalking Stalking Threats; obscene
communications
Cyberstalking
(felony)
Stalking Stalking
Reasonable
Person
Standard?
Yes
Actor knows or has
reason to know it would
cause victim under the
circumstances to feel
fear, and actually
causes fear
Sometimes
(see “credible threat”)
No, but has broad
standard that covers
the intent “to
terrorize” or “to
harass”
No, but has broad
standard that
covers the intent
“to harass”
Yes, for stalking
Yes, plus
credible threat
for aggravated
stalking
Yes
Credible
Threat
Standard?
No Sometimes
Any person who
willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows
or harasses another
person, or makes a
credible threat, with the
intent to place that
person in reasonable
fear of death or injury
No Sometimes
Requires language
threatening to
inflict injury or for
extortion; to
knowingly make
false statements
intending to
threaten, terrify, or
harass; larger
penalty if there is a
credible threat
Yes, for
aggravated
stalking
No
Requires
Actual Physical
Pursuit?
No No No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communic-
ations?
Yes Unclear Yes Yes
Electronic
communication has
to be received by a
person with a
unique address
Yes Yes
Potential
Statutory
Problems
1. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
1. Electronic
communications are not
explicitly covered.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
1. May only apply to
direct contact with
the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (e-
mail), not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.
1. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker
dupes an
“innocent” third
party to harass.
1. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
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Montana Nebraska Nevada Nevada New Hampshire
Code MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
8-213 (2005).
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 28-311.02-03
(2005).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
200.575 (West 2005).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.571 (West 2005).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
633:3-a (2005).
Title Privacy in
Communications
Stalking Stalking Harassment Stalking
Reasonable
Person
Standard?
No No, but has broad
standard that covers
conduct that “seriously
terrifies, threatens, or
intimidates.” § 28-
311.02(2)(a).
Yes (Stalking,
misdemeanor)
No (Aggravated Stalking,
felony)
No Yes
Credible Threat
Standard?
Sometimes
use of obscene or lewd
language or a threat
No No (Stalking)
Yes (Aggravated
Stalking)
Yes No
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
No No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communic-
ations?
Yes Unclear Yes
“Person who commits
stalking using Internet . . .
to publish, display, or
distribute information in a
manner that substantially
increases the risk of harm
or violence to the victim.”
§ 200.575(3)
No Yes
Notes This statute may apply
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass and would make it
a felony charge. See §
200.575(3)
Potential
Statutory
Problems
1. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
Although “cyberstalking”
is not specifically
mentioned, this statute
may apply to most aspects
of cyberstalking.
1. Requires a threat.
2. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
1. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
[Note, N.H. harassment
statute held
unconstitutional. State v.
Pierce, 887 A.2d 132
(N.H. 2005) (finding N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4
(2005), unconstitutional).
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New Jersey New Jersey New Mexico New Mexico New York New York
Code N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:12-10 (West
2005).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:33-4 (West 2005).
N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30-3A-3 (West
2005).
N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-3A-2 (West
2005).
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
240.25-26
(McKinney 2005).
N.Y. PENAL LAW §
240.30 (McKinney
2005).
Title Stalking Harassment
(misdemeanor)
Stalking Harassment
(misdemeanor)
Harassment Aggravated
Harassment
Reasonable Person
Standard?
No No, but has broad
standard that covers
conduct that “causes
annoyance”
Yes Yes Yes No, but has broad
standard that covers
conduct with the
intent “to harass”
Credible Threat
Standard?
Yes No No No No No
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Sometimes
Either maintain
physical proximity or
threaten
No No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Not specifically Not specifically Not specifically Not specifically Not specifically Yes
Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. Requires a threat
or physical
proximity.
2. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
3. May only apply to
direct contact with
the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings.
4. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May not apply
to electronic
communications.
2. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.
1. May not apply
to electronic
communications.
2. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent”
third party to
harass.
1. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
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New York New York New York North Carolina North Carolina
Code N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
120.45-50 (McKinney
2005).
N.Y. PENAL LAW §
120.55 (McKinney
2005).
N.Y. PENAL LAW §
120.60 (McKinney
2005).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
14-277.3 (West 2005).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
14-196.3 (West 2005).
Title 4th & 3rd Deg. Stalking
(misdemeanors)
2rd Deg. Stalking
(felony)
1st Deg. Stalking
(felony)
Stalking Cyberstalking
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Yes Yes Yes Yes No, but has broad
standard that covers the
intent “to harass”
Credible Threat
Standard?
No No No No No
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
No Yes, must display a
weapon
Yes, must cause
physical injury
Sometimes
Either harasses or
physically follows
No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Likely No No Yes Yes
Notes Similar to Louisiana’s
cyberstalking statute
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. Requires physical
display of weapon.
2. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. Requires physical
display of weapon.
2. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
North Carolina has a
model statute, but it is
not explicitly clear
whether it applies when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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North Dakota North Dakota Ohio Ohio Oklahoma Oklahoma
Code N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-17-07.1
(2005).
N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-17-07 (2005).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2903.211 (West 2005).
OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2917.21
(West 2005).
OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, §§ 1172-73
(West 2005).
OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1953(8)-
(9) (West 2005).
Title Stalking Harassment Menacing by Stalking Telecommunications
Harassment
Harassment
Stalking
Computer Crimes
Act
(misdemeanor)
Reasonable
Person
Standard?
Yes No, uses broad
standard that
covers the intent
“to harass,” but
requires a threat
Similar standard (conduct
that would “cause another
person to believe that the
offender will cause physical
harm”). § 2903.211(A)(1).
No, but uses broad
standard that covers
the intent “to harass”
Yes No, but uses broad
standard that
covers the intent
“to harass”
Credible
Threat
Standard?
No Yes Yes, for 4th Deg. Stalking
(felony), a threat is required.
§ 2903.211(A)(2)(b).
No No No
Requires
Actual Physical
Pursuit?
No No No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communic-
ations?
Not specifically Yes Yes Yes
See OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2913.01
(West 2005).
Yes Yes
Potential
Statutory
Problems
1. May not apply
to electronic
communications.
2. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.
1. Requires threat.
2. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (e-
mail), not other
Internet postings.
3. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.
Although not explicitly
entitled a cyberstalking
statute, Ohio has a model
statute, particularly because
it is one of the few that
explicitly addresses
“innocent” third party
harassers. § 2903.211(A)(2)
(“No person, through the
use of any electronic
method of remotely
transferring information,
including, but not limited to,
any computer, computer
network, computer program,
or computer system, shall
post a message with purpose
to urge or incite another to
commit a violation of
division (A)(1) of this
section.”) (emphasis added).
1. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.
1. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent”
third party to
harass.
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Oregon Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island Rhode Island South Carolina
Code OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 163.732 (West
2003).
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
166.065(1)(c) (West
2003).
18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2709 to
2709.1 (West
2005).
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
11-59-1 and 2
(2004).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2
(2004).
S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-1700
(2005).
Title Stalking Harassment Stalking
Harassing
Stalking Cyberstalking Harassment
Stalking
Reasonable
Person
Standard?
Yes, but requires
direct contact
No Yes No, but has broad
harassment
standard
Yes Yes
Credible
Threat
Standard?
Yes
statutory provisions
make it clear that
threat or its
equivalent must have
been made for crime
of stalking to be
found. See State v.
Shields, 56 P.3d 937
(Or. Ct. App. 2002);
State v. Rangel, 934
P.2d 1128 (Or. Ct.
App. 1997).
Yes No No No No
Requires
Actual Physical
Pursuit?
No No No Yes, physical
following when
reasonable person
standard is used. §
11-59-2(a)(2).
No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communic-
ations?
Yes. See OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. §
163.730 (West 2003).
Yes Yes Not specifically Yes Yes, for 2nd
Deg. Harassment
(misdemeanor)
Potential
Statutory
Problems
1. May only apply to
direct contact with
the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. Requires threat.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
1. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (e-
mail), not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to
harass.
1. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.
Rhode Island has a model
statute, particularly because it is
one of the few that explicitly
addresses “innocent” third party
harassers. See § 11-52-4.2(a)
(“Whoever transmits any
communication by computer to
any person or causes any person
to be contacted for the sole
purpose of harassing that person
or his or her family is
guilty…”)(emphasis added).
1. May not
apply when a
cyberstalker
dupes an
“innocent” third
party to harass
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South Dakota Tennessee Tennessee Texas Texas Utah
Code S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-19A-1
(2005).
TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-17-315 (West
2005).
TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-17-308 (West
2005).
TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 42.072
(Vernon 2005).
TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 42.07
(Vernon 2005).
UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-106 (West
2005).
Title Stalking Stalking Harassment Stalking Harassment Harassment
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Yes, but requires
threat; also has
broad harassment
standard
Yes, but requires
contact
No Yes No No
Credible Threat
Standard?
Yes (one option; see
“reasonable person
standard”)
No (Stalking)
Yes (Aggravated
Stalking)
Yes No Yes Yes
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
No No No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Yes Yes
Non-consensual
contact includes
sending electronic
communications
Yes Not specifically Yes
Electronic
communication
includes a
communication
initiated by e-mail
or instant message
Not specifically
Notes Statute requires
either an obscene
proposal or threat
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. May require
threat.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (e-
mail), not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. Requires threat.
2. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (e-
mail), not other
Internet postings.
3. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. Requires obscene
proposal or threat.
2. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (e-
mail), not other
Internet postings.
3. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. Requires a threat.
2. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
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Utah Utah Vermont Vermont Virginia
Code UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-106.5 (West
2005).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-201
(West 2005).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 1061 (2005).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1027 (2005).
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1
(West 2005).
Title Stalking Electronic Communication
Harassment
Stalking Disturbing Peace by
Use of Electronic
Communication
(misdemeanor)
Harassment by Computer
(misdemeanor)
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Yes, but requires a
threat
No, but has standard where
stalker insults, taunts, or
challenges the recipient in a
manner likely to provoke a
violent or disorderly response
Yes No No, but broad harassment
standard
Credible Threat
Standard?
Yes
visual or physical
proximity to a
person, or threats
Yes (one option; see “reasonable
person standard”)
No Yes Yes (one option; see “reasonable
person standard”)
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Either physical
pursuit or a threat
No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Not specifically Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes Also prevents conduct that
causes disruption, jamming, or
overload of an electronic
communication system through
excessive message traffic of
other means utilizing
communication device.
May address e-mail
bombs. See § 13-
1027(a)(iii)
May cover “innocent” third
party harassers. “use [of] a
computer…to communicate
obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd,
lascivious, or indecent language,
or make any suggestion or
proposal of an obscene nature.”
§ 18.2-152.7:1.
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. May require a
threat.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with
the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings.
3. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. There are potential
constitutional issues with this
statute. See, e.g., Provo City
Corp. v. Thompson, 86 P.3d 735
(Utah 2004).
2. May only apply to direct
contact with the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet
postings.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
1. May require
obscene proposal or
threat.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
If “innocent” third party
harassers are covered by this
statute, then it may cover most
aspects of cyberstalking;
however, it is written so broadly
that it may create constitutional
issues.
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Virginia Washington Washington Washington Washington
Code VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
60.3 (West 2005).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.61.260 (West
2005).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.46.110 (West
2005), amended by 2006
Wash. Legis. Serv. Page
no. 2 (West).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.46.020 (West
2005).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.61.230 (West
2005).
Title Stalking Cyberstalking Stalking Harassment Telephone Harassment
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Yes No, but has broad
harassment standard
Yes No No, but has broad
harassment standard
Credible Threat
Standard?
No Yes (one option; see
“reasonable person
standard”)
No Yes Yes (one option; see
“reasonable person
standard”)
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
No No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Not specifically Yes Yes Yes No
Notes May cover e-mail
bombs. See §
9.61.260(1)(b).
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
Washington has a
model statute,
particularly because it is
one of the few that
explicitly addresses
“innocent” third party
harassers. See §
9.61.260(1)(a) (“A
person is guilty of
cyberstalking if he or
she. . . makes an
electronic
communication to such
other person or a third
party…Using any lewd,
lascivious, indecent, or
obscene words, images,
or language, or
suggesting the
commission of any lewd
or lascivious act.”)
(emphasis added).
1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. Statute has been held
unconstitutional. See
State v. Williams, 26
P.3d 890 (Wash. 2001).
2. Requires threat.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. Does not apply to
electronic
communications
(limited only to
telephone
communications).
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West Virginia West Virginia Wisconsin Wisconsin Wisconsin
Code W. VA. CODE ANN. §
61-2-9a (LexisNexis
2005).
W. VA. CODE ANN. §
61-3C-14a (LexisNexis
2005).
WIS. STAT. ANN. §
940.32 (West 2005).
WIS. STAT. ANN. §
947.013 (West 2005).
WIS. STAT. ANN. §
947.0125 (West 2005).
Title Stalking
Harassment
Threatening
Communications by
Computer
Stalking Harassment Unlawful use of
computerized
communication systems
(misdemeanor)
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Yes
See § 61-2-9a(g)(1)
No, uses broad
harassment standard,
but requires cyberstalker
to contact victim
Yes, but requires direct
contact with victim
No, but uses broad
harassment standard
No, but uses broad
harassment standard
Credible Threat
Standard?
Yes (one option; see
“physical pursuit”)
Yes (one option) No Yes (one option; see
“reasonable person
standard”)
Yes (one option; see
“reasonable person
standard”)
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Sometimes
Requires following
unless there is repeated
harassing or credible
threats
No No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Not specifically Yes Not specifically, but
course of conduct
includes sending
material by any means
to the victim
Not specifically Yes
Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May only apply to
messages sent directly
to the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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Wyoming
Code WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-
506 (2005).
Title Stalking
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Yes, but may require a
threat. See § 6-2-
506(a)(ii).
Credible Threat
Standard?
Yes. See § 6-2-
506(a)(ii).
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Yes
Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. May require a threat.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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APPENDIX: FEDERAL CODES
FEDERAL CODE FEDERAL CODE FEDERAL CODE
Code 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
(2006)
47 U.S.C. § 223 18 U.S.C. § 2261A
(2006)
Title Interstate
Communications Act
Federal Telephone
Harassment Statute
Federal Interstate
Stalking Punishment
and Prevention Act
Reasonable Person
Standard?
No No, but has broad
harassment standard
Yes
Credible Threat
Standard?
Yes No No
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
No No No
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Yes Yes Yes
Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems
1. Requires a threat.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. Requires messages to
be anonymously sent.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
